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‘Sharing the Same Roof’?: A Consociational Approach to the Compatibility 
 
of Cultural Identity Schools with Liberal Democratic Values 
 
Thomas Joachim Bohler 
 
Abstract 
 
      This study critically examines the congruence of liberal democratic values with a 
conceptual framework for a national system of state-funded cultural identity schools. The 
study argues that the Modernist-Enlightenment response of difference-blind neutrality to the 
fact of social pluralism implicitly sanctions dominant socioeconomic structures. For this 
reason, the claim is made that the equal rights of citizenship justify cultural identity schools 
under a stance of difference-sensitivity. It is conceptualized that the existence of these schools 
benefit the liberal democratic state in two major ways. First, they incorporate non-Western 
immigrants into increasingly polyethnic societies as free and equal citizens. Second, in an era 
where deliberative democracy is threatened by global market forces, these schools serve as 
engines of healthy civil society by reinvigorating local voluntary associations. 
      The study looks to the state educational system of the Netherlands to empirically 
ground theoretical formulations. For almost a century, the government there has funded and 
regulated a diverse array of schools with considerable autonomy in pedagogical content and 
practices. In terms of group rights, the educational structure reflects the historical experience 
of pillarization, a form of legal pluralism which proportionately distributed resources and 
political representation to national subgroups. The thesis proposes educational pillarization 
has utility to the current problem of disaffected immigrant groups in Western democratic 
states. 
      Especially with regard to pleas for state-funded Islamic schooling, the study modifies 
consociational theory to reconcile imperatives for religo-cultural development and rights with 
those for liberal democratic principles. The study concludes that the consensus-making 
processes at the heart of legal pluralism encourage intercultural competence and reconfigure 
the meaning of citizenship to reflect the exigencies of the present day. Though many people 
see freedom from their childhood/received cultures as enriching, cultural attachments, provide 
the psychological terrain for evaluating the meaning of choice. However, a delicate balance 
exists. The study argues that cultural identity schools should not close students off from 
alternate life pathways since the right to exit or modify one’s culture is firmly embedded in 
liberalism.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Whatever the context, state-sponsored compulsory education confronts a variety of 
challenges in accommodating religio-cultural minorities. What is taught, who teaches it and 
how it is taught provide insights into how a nation deals with intersectionalities of culture, 
class and colour. Discords within the larger society also appear within the intense social 
interaction of what Dewey termed the ‘special social environment’ of schools (1916/1966). 
And since schools mediate between the national interest and the cultural allegiance of 
families, they serve as bellwethers for socio-political change. More than any other institution 
of national life, schools are flashpoints for the problem of pluralism. 
Traditionally, the Modernist-Enlightenment model of universal citizenship served as 
the default remedy to the challenges of pluralism. The logic of this model begins with the 
premise of state neutrality toward particularities of cultural identity. But neutrality remains a 
contested construct. Every Western democracy is the site of varying degrees of controversy 
over whether its public institutions actually treat minority groups as free and equal citizens. In 
particular, recent critiques of liberal theory question the primacy of the individual in Western 
jurisprudence and social policy (e.g., MacIntyre, 1984; Walzer, 1983, 1992, 1994). Broadly 
understood, these arguments contend that the values and practices of minority groups are 
disciplined and conditioned through Western cultural and economic practices under the guise 
of difference-blind policies (e.g., Kymlicka, 1992, 1995; Modood, 2005; Young, 2000). 
Any response to the problem of pluralism must also account for how global market 
forces shape incongruities between the normative and organizational goals of democracy, 
citizenship and education. As demands for international competitiveness spur the 
reconfiguration of national educational systems, the conflation of public and private interest 
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threatens the egalitarian aspirations promised, if seldom delivered, by state-sponsored 
schooling. First, there is the concern about whether the market model reinforces and 
perpetuates social inequality. Second, there is the problem concerning how the penetration of 
the market model has altered the practices and perceptions of liberal democracy (Wolin, 
2008). Through the conflation of individual freedom with market freedom, components of the 
modern civil liberties package became coupled to ideological imperatives for minimizing 
economic regulation. As a result, the ethos of late global capitalism reconceptualises 
traditional conceptions of liberty, justice and equality. However, the nature of resistance to 
transnational non-democratic entities such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) suggests globalization as an integrative 
phenomenon with cultural pluralism as counter-hegemony (Chan-Tibergien, 2006). This point 
will be developed further in Chapter Four.   
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
This study critically examines the congruence of liberal democratic values with the 
model of a national educational system affording the option of cultural identity schools, that 
is, schools premised in a particular religious, cultural or philosophical worldview. The 
purpose is to integrate key understandings into a conceptual framework from which to 
develop theoretical and practical possibilities. Toward this end, the study tests theories 
relevant to the question against the history, development and current form of the state 
educational system of the Netherlands. Here, the government funds and regulates a diverse 
array of schools with considerable autonomy in pedagogical content and practices. In keeping 
with liberal egalitarian principles, the progressive funding mechanism answers familiar equity 
concerns about school choice. Financial resources allocated to schools follow individual 
students according to a needs-based formula. In terms of group rights, the educational 
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structure reflects the historical experience of pillarization, a form of legal pluralism which 
proportionately distributed resources and political representation to national subgroups 
(Lijphart, 1968a, 1969, 1985). Broadly understood, legal pluralism refers to a condition in 
which a population observes more than one body of law (Shahar, 2008). It will be argued that 
a reconfiguration of this century-old arrangement provides a potential framework for 
alleviating problems attendant to non-Western immigration.  
Liberal theory grapples with the problem of what special rights, if any, should be 
extended to satisfy religio-cultural group demands for equal recognition (e.g., Barry, 2002; 
Kymlicka, 1989a, 1995; Modood, 2005; Young, 1990, 2000). Liberal thought, admittedly, 
comprises a complexity of competing strands, where ontological formulations are contingent 
and contested. But three salient themes can be distilled from liberalism’s intellectual arc—
neutrality, autonomy and equality. In broad terms, neutrality means the state actor refrains 
from interfering in private matters of the good. Autonomy signals a commitment to individual 
choice and action. Legal equality implies a polity animated by a commitment to fair access to 
the institutional machinery for participatory democracy. In assessing whether a template for 
cultural identity schools can satisfy these three touchstones, I weigh the arguments promoted 
by proponents of what McDonough (1998) calls ‘the cultural recognition thesis’ (e.g., 
Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994), and theorists tending toward traditional autonomy based 
individualism (e.g., Kant, 1785/1983; Locke, 1689/1988; Rawls, 1993). Through referencing 
historical examples and theoretical possibilities, I test the viability of an intermediary position 
of legal pluralism whereby financial support for cultural identity schools might be congruent 
with liberal politico-ethical values when certain precondition are satisfied through a state-
mediated process of discussion and compromise.  
The study assumes the desirability of the broadening definition of citizenship reflected 
in the growing body of Third Culture literature (e.g., Pollock & Van Reken, 2009; Zilber, 
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2009).1 At the level of the individual citizen, this formulation provides room for individual 
growth and the postmodern reality of multiple cultural affiliations (e.g., Kubow, Grossman & 
Ninomiya, 2000). In this light, the stark choice between inherited culture and the 
opportunities of the larger society constitutes a false dilemma. Cultural identity schools would 
have the dialectical function of encouraging students to critically examine their own particular 
tradition. Difficulty occurs when groups with illiberal religio-cultural identities demand state 
support. Such demands require oversight and a system for continuous dialogue between state 
and school authorities. As strict isolation fosters parochialism and mistrust, a constructive 
relationship might be facilitated if the state acts as an ‘even-handed’ custodian of minority 
cultures, affording equal access for groups to attain financial support in exchange for a 
commitment to commonly understood human rights principles (Bader, 2003; Carens, 2000). 
This reciprocal arrangement has the effect of encouraging political participation around a set 
of shared principles. ‘The ideal model of deliberative democracy says that all those whose 
basic interests are affected by a decision ought to be included in the deliberative democracy 
process’ (Young, 2000, p. 27). Through these exchanges, formalized through state mediation, 
the airing of differences will be examined as a starting point for good faith deliberation, while 
also serving a safety valve function in quelling the frustrations that foment radicalism.  
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Today’s narrative of immigration and integration into Western democratic states 
occurs within the complex matrix of post-War decolonization, sectarian conflict and global 
economic integration. Former subjects immigrated to the lands of their imperial masters to 
find work in unskilled or semiskilled occupations. They were later joined by waves of 
                                                          
1 Used in this sense, Third Culture refers to a term first employed by Ruth Hill Useem to describe the experience 
of children who accompany their parents into another societal culture (Zilber, 2009). 
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‘temporary’ reinforcements, guest workers with little or no cultural or linguistic ties to their 
host nations. Faith in a harmonious multicultural future, vestigial colonial obligation and guilt 
encouraged governments to adopt family reunification policies. Ancient kinship networks re-
established themselves after workers were joined by wives, children and parents. Many 
extended families settled permanently in parallel communities.  
Economic and political immigrants, some scarred by violence, continue to find refuge 
within many of these self-contained enclaves, where the familiar sounds and smells of distant 
homelands waft through busy streets and along dark apartment corridors. These borderlands, 
often located at the periphery of urban areas, represent a psychological neither-here-nor-there 
for unassimilated outsiders caught between the old homeland that could not sustain them and 
the new homeland that will not accept them. Europe’s colonial possessions have now been 
replaced by a highly visible Muslim ‘internal colony, whose numbers are roughly equivalent 
to the population of Syria’ (Leiken, 2005, p. 123). Here, the interplay of transnational 
allegiances and post-materialist worldviews create fissures within the ontological framework 
of the liberal democratic state. 
Recent anti-government violence in Swedish and French immigrant suburbs 
(banlieues) represents the frustrations of an underclass lacking opportunities in labour, 
education and housing. In Germany, a disproportionate number of immigrant children find 
themselves placed on the lowest rung (Hauptschule) of the tripartite educational system, or in 
special needs schools, Sonderschulen (Auernheimer, 2006; Friedemann, 2006). In Canada, 
long a model for immigrant nations, recent research finds the new wave of predominantly 
non-Western immigrants not faring as well as their predecessors. ‘Their incomes are lower, 
and they are having more difficulty getting established, even though they are generally well 
educated in their home countries’ (Levin, 2008, p. 394). In the Netherlands, a country with a 
long reputation for social tolerance, attention has focused on low academic attainment and 
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problems with the criminal justice system plaguing young, mostly Dutch-born Turkish and 
Moroccan males. This cohort is said to be less interested than were their fathers or 
grandfathers in adapting to Dutch society and accepting the types of jobs open to those with 
few formal qualifications (Wolfgram, 2009).  
In the case of the Netherlands, frequent media attention has focused on ‘problem 
neighbourhoods’ (probleemwijken). These are housing developments constructed from the 
nineteen fifties to the nineteen eighties to accommodate the immigrant influx. Today, these 
neighbourhoods are beset by a breakdown in social capital, as measured by high crime rates 
and underperforming schools, the so-called ‘black schools’ (Crul & Pasztor, 2007). These 
areas have become known as Vogellaarwijken, after former Minister of Housing and 
Integration Ella Vogellaar. In 2007, she unveiled an ambitious plan to target forty of these 
areas with wide-ranging reforms, including beautification projects, injections of business 
capital and supplemental assistance to schools and social service providers. However, 
improvement in social indicators has proven elusive, and there has been a dearth in hoped-for 
private sector investment (Van Eerenbeemt & Rengers, 2009). The nearly one billion euro of 
public monies spent has become an ideological cudgel, a right wing leitmotif for attacking 
social spending in parliament and the press (Vermeer, 2013).  
The tenor of debate around this issue is but one symptom of how the former Western 
confidence in a multicultural order based on harmonious coexistence has waned. Post-9/11 
existential angst provides the subtext for a hardening in public attitudes and official policy 
around national identity concerns (Gudbrandsen, 2010). Sides and Citrin (2007a) suggest 
European Union citizens hold exaggerated beliefs about the number of immigrants in their 
countries and their drain on the social welfare system. These perceptions are reflected in 
government assessments that four decades of multicultural policies have failed (Herzinger, 
2010). The electorate’s views on crime, terrorism and intergenerational dependence on 
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government assistance underpin the depiction of irredentist and disloyal minorities in the 
agendas of right wing political movements, including the British National Party, the Danish 
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), the Flemish Interest (Vlaam Belang) and the Party of 
Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands (Stöss, 2006). Mainstream parties, 
sensitive to the electorate’s mood, have dutifully adopted anti-immigrant planks (Driessen, 
2012). Not surprisingly, political clamour around the issue of non-Western immigrant 
populations increases during times of economic uncertainty (Sides & Citrin, 2007b). 
In Marx’s formula, social class energized collective identity and human progress. 
However, with the loss of Marxism as a reference point, the politicization of group identities, 
where identity is claimed to be cultural, filled the ideological vacuum. This is exemplified in 
demands for the legitimization of difference through the legal extension of group rights, what 
Taylor calls ‘equal authenticity’ (1994). Huntington (1996) traces the cause of inter- and 
intra-societal conflicts to fundamentally opposed cultural values. The West won the world, 
not through superior ideas, but by ‘its superiority in applying organized violence’ 
(Huntington, p. 51). For Mill (1861/1972), the viability of the liberal state presupposes a 
degree of cultural homogeneity. ‘Among a people without fellow-feelings, especially if they 
read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the workings of 
representative institutions cannot exist’ (Mill, p. 230). As Western democracies confront ever-
increasing levels of cultural pluralism, the discussion navigates two poles: On the one hand, 
there is concern that assimilatory projects carry the baggage of cultural imperialism, on the 
other, there is the concern about ghettoization and civic fragmentation.  
Self-contained settlement patterns and imported civic structures provide communal 
anchors for uprooted groups. However, these collectives often present as cultural beachheads 
alien to the economic and intellectual dimensions of capitalist societies. Economic liberty 
includes the right to accumulate and protect property. Intellectual liberty includes what is now 
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recognizable as the contemporary civil liberties package, especially with respect to freedom of 
conscience (Locke, 1689/1988). Taken together, these liberties create the conditions for the 
antagonistic modes of decision-making at the definitional core of liberal democracy 
(Seligman, 1992). Here, the value of diversity must be measured against imperatives for 
social stability. Though reference to the constitutional order exerts a tempering effect on 
public discourse, intrastate violence arising from strident assertions of collective identity 
occurs within even the most mature of advanced democracies. Given that the rights and 
liberties underlying the liberal state may fuel the activities of illiberal groups, the fact of 
cultural diversity presents challenges for both the theory and practice of liberal politics 
(Talisse, 2005). 
For Locke (1685/1983), neutrality meant that the state tolerate religious or 
philosophical impulses as long as they do not infringe on other citizens’ natural rights. Yet the 
modern focus on the individual creates inconsistencies insofar as the application of state 
neutrality and toleration are concerned. The French Revolution ushered in a new conception 
of citizenship which ‘codified individual rights and freedoms as attributes of national 
citizenship, thus linking the individual with the nation-state’ (Soysal, 1994). In this regard, the 
closed environment of schools poses special challenges. When state schools serve as fulcrums 
of a purportedly shared civic culture, the sphere of education may be neutral in theory but 
actually reinforce the position of prevailing hierarchies in the workforce and other social 
structures. As a result, the focus on individual rights threatens to legitimate inequality under 
the guise of equality (Young, 1990). 
  
1.4 Significance of the Study 
In the liberal democratic state, the centrality of individual autonomy to citizen self-
understanding creates hard choices for members of de-territorialized religio-cultural groups. 
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Because the first and second generations negotiate between the cultural values and traditions 
of their families and those of their secular host nation, the state and orthodox groups situate 
themselves as natural competitors for the hearts and minds of children. When fundamentalists 
challenge the norms, customs and traditions of their new homelands, they test the forbearance 
of their hosts.  
Today’s policymakers face difficult decisions when the cultural content of groups 
includes illiberal views. These views include what in Western democracies constitute abusive 
or subversive stances toward women, children and other faith groups and lifestyles. These 
stances cannot be reconciled with state schooling. This is especially true when states face 
types of diversity that privilege divine laws over those legislated through democratic 
processes and tested in courts. For the great majority of citizens in the West, values such as 
gender equality and the rights of apostates to leave their faith groups are non-negotiable. 
Indeed, the broad identification with these values contributes to the majority’s growing 
discomfort with visibly unassimilated groups (Merry & Driessen, 2005).  
Contemporary liberals instinctively welcome the idea of cultural pluralism, even as 
they recognize the threat to individualism posed by communities ‘which do not favour or 
prioritize individual autonomy, but prefer to see the individual as closely bound within the 
traditions of the group’ (Burtonwood, 2000, pp. 269-270). Liberal states face the problem of 
how to define citizenship in light of what Kymlicka (1994) calls ‘constituent communities’; 
namely, when two or more groups share a national border but possess radically different 
beliefs. These sub-national groupings compete for the loyalties of citizens and may claim 
special rights or regional territorial sovereignty. As a consequence, the value cultural diversity 
brings to enriching the fabric of a nation must be weighed against two main points. First, the 
ability of states to ensure peaceful coexistence with subgroups possessing intense religio-
cultural solidarity. Second, the ability of individuals to exercise free will and rewrite their life-
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scripts in the face of constraints dictated by group membership. These points converge around 
the ability of citizens to agree on a common set of constitutional principles. In other words, 
public discourse must find some degree of intercultural resonance if basic agreement on the 
rights and obligations of citizenship is to exist. Without the shared vocabulary for forging a 
minimal level of consensus around shared rules and institutions, the institutional machinery of 
democracy may exist, but democratic culture will falter. For the terms of dialogue not to be 
co-opted by the ‘false generosity’ of elites (Freire, 1970/2007), requires formal 
acknowledgement of the differentiated social positions of citizens (e.g., Bader, 2003; 
Kymlikca, 1995; Young, 1990).  
Can a model premised in educational free agency and broad curricular latitude 
resonate with liberal democratic values and gradually integrate vertically aligned religio-
cultural groups into the national life as free and equal citizens? To address this question, the 
thesis takes a qualitative methodological approach, inductively testing conceptual possibilities 
around the following research objectives: 
 To explore to what extent, if any, cultural identity schools act as counter-hegemony to 
the market model in education. 
 To explore whether cultural identity schools might foster democratic dialogue and the 
associative networks underpinning civil society and participatory democracy. 
 To explore whether cultural identity schools are a natural consequence for satisfying 
the requirement to the equal right of citizenship. 
This line of inquiry is especially relevant today because states are challenged at the 
subnational level by the ‘efflorescence and revitalizations of solidarity groupings with 
multiple bases—regional, linguistic, religious, ethnic, and life-style—as well as a bewildering 
array of novel social movements that generate their own solidarity’ (Torres, 2013, p. 364). 
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These challenges to the continued relevance and legitimacy of the liberal democratic state 
play out at the school level.   
 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
The question of state funding to schools supportive of a particular religious, cultural or 
philosophical worldview was framed in terms of congruence to liberal politico-ethical values. 
The adequacy of the Modernist-Enlightenment response to questions of pluralism was 
reviewed. It was posited that today’s realities may demand a more expansive definition of 
citizenship and a reconfiguration of the relationship between state education and religio-
cultural groups through some manner of legal pluralism. Beginning from these assumptions, 
the study progresses through three interwoven themes: first, the problem is defined; second, 
competing responses are tested; third, a remedy is proposed. 
Chapter Two contextualizes the issues at hand: first, against the historical trajectory of 
how states engage pluralism; and, second, how the global penetration of late capitalism 
impacts the discussion. ‘It is now increasingly difficult to understand education in any context 
without reference to the global forces that influence policy and practice’ (Crossley & Jarvis 
2000, p. 324). Though strands of liberalism are hospitable to group rights, the vocabulary of 
political liberalism has historically been employed to rally allegiance away from multicultural 
policies toward the dominant culture’s model of citizenship (e.g., Joppke, 2007a, 2007b; 
Young, 1990, 1999). In this context, group rights are examined as a means of expanding the 
definitional orbit of citizenship and enhancing the strength of the associative networks at the 
heart of deliberative democracy. These networks, of which schools are a lynchpin, engage 
citizens in the everyday experience of civil society, and theoretically provide a hyper-pluralist 
remedy to the social reproductionist tendencies inherent to the market model. 
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Chapter Three critically examines the idea of liberal neutrality. It contrasts three state 
responses consequent to cultural identity schools. The chapter looks into the proposition that 
claims to state neutrality may be hollow without a difference-sensitive framework for legal 
pluralism (Bader, 2003). Further, the chapter discusses how reciprocity might factor into 
acceptance of financial support.  
Agreement on conditions assumes a process of consensus-making, whose challenges 
and opportunities are examined in Chapter Four. Negotiation and bargaining provide the 
conceptual underpinnings for the formation and sustenance of cultural identity schools, and 
provide insight into how their existence might represent an important contribution to 
deliberative democracy. This underscores the assumption that, by its own justifications, 
political liberalism requires these schools so long as human rights norms are respected. 
Chapter Five empirically tests previous theoretical analysis. The chapter defines and 
historicizes Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) consociational model, providing an analytical 
framework for how religo-cultural aspirations and national cohesion might be achieved in 
difficult plural settings. With reference to the potential for cultural identity schools as a modus 
vivendi, the history of social segmentation in the Netherlands provides insights into how legal 
pluralism might assume a more inclusive character over time. 
Chapter Six’s deconstruction of the school system in the Netherlands operationalizes 
elements relevant to the research question in terms of: 1) how mechanisms regulating school 
choice answer key egalitarian concerns voiced by opponents of educational free agency; 2) 
the increasing demand by Muslim groups for their own schools; 3) the long historical 
congruence of the educational system with subgroup autonomy; and 4) the high level of 
measured academic success enjoyed by students in the Netherlands relative to their OECD 
peers (Fuchs & Wößmann, 2007).   
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Chapter Seven extends the research objectives into a conceptual framework comparing 
cultural identity schools with government schools, that is, schools adopting a difference-blind 
approach to religio-cultural identity through uniformity in curriculum and teaching. The 
chapter evaluates moral justifications for educational pluralism on the basis of the equal rights 
to citizenship. Chapter Eight integrates analysis of issues to provide forward-looking 
theoretical and practical implications and limitations related to this framework. 
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Chapter 2: The Nature of Education in Plural Democracies  
  
2.1 Conceptual Underpinnings   
Section 1 of this chapter contextualizes the historical and theoretical underpinnings of 
the problem of cultural identity schools. I first outline the implications of the post-
Reformation state’s strategy of controlling civil strife through privatizing religio-cultural 
identity. I then explore how the theoretical literature reconciles political liberalism with the 
challenges posed by pluralism, and how the resultant stances—from universalism to 
communitarianism—impact the discussion regarding schooling. This section anticipates 
Chapter Three’s examination of the application of state neutrality to the problem of cultural 
identity schools and Chapter Four’s discussion of consensus building models, especially in 
terms of the differences between Rawls’ (1993) idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ between 
competing doctrines and Kymlicka’s (1989a, 1989b, 1995) narrower group autonomy model. 
In Section 2, I locate the problem of state schooling within today’s post-Marxist 
political nomenclature, where neoliberal understandings of individual responsibility and 
meritocracy provide the currency of the realm. To co-opt the positive historical resonance of 
liberty, the prevailing economic narrative of efficient market equilibrium acquired new 
heuristic devices, re-shaping the meanings and purposes of the civil liberties underpinning the 
plural democratic state. The linguistic fusion of capitalism and democracy equates ‘free 
markets’ with ‘free people’, with a resultant ruling principle that commands considerable 
traction in the popular consciousness. Neoliberal rhetoric celebrates the ‘freedom’ of material 
acquisition and the shedding of government responsibility for the lower echelons of the 
citizenry (Harvey, 2005). Similar discursive strategies were employed throughout the history 
of Western imperialism to justify mercantilist policies and ‘define what has the right to be 
said and done in the culture in question’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 27). Simply put, the near-
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unassailability of market based policies shape rigid parameters for contemporary public policy 
discussion. 
Taken together, these two sections provide the overarching definitional contours to the 
problem of cultural identity schools in the liberal democratic state. 
 
2.2 Theoretical and Historical Perspective 
After the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the appeal of 
doctrinal conformity as the only means to prevent civil strife was replaced by the idea of 
religious and philosophical toleration. As Western states replaced religious tenets with secular 
constitutional principles as the regulatory framework for their societies, the principle of 
tolerance was extended. The post-Reformation state was characterized by strong 
differentiation between the public and private spheres. Churches were deprived of their 
political rights and became private institutions. These anti-clerical tendencies were part of the 
liberal battle to negate group rights, a process which accelerated after the French Revolution. 
‘Liberal democracy emerged in part as a reaction against the way that feudalism defined 
individual’s political rights and economic opportunities by their group membership’ 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 34). This early aversion to group right claims was reinforced in the 
Enlightenment project’s belief in a unifying doctrine around the precept that, since citizens 
embody a common humanity, government must be impartial and treat each citizen equally. 
Thus, by occluding classical republican virtues with the natural rights philosophy, the ancient 
understanding of individuals as part of community was displaced by the call of modernity. At 
base, this discussion concerns how to calibrate gradations of liberty with those of equality. 
‘Too much liberty, or at least too much liberty in certain forms, may undermine equality. Too 
much equality, or at least too much in certain forms, may undermine liberty’ (Putnam, 2000, 
p. 346). 
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Kant (1785/1983) saw rational agency as the source of stability for the liberal polity, 
and Locke (1689/1988) argued state legitimacy must be premised in natural rights conferred 
by a higher power. However, the legal equality and neutrality underpinning ideas of unitary 
republican citizenship also provide a means of justifying political authority (Young, 1990, 
1999). In other words, the construction of a superstructure for a unified civic culture 
diminishes subcultural practices and beliefs. To be sure, nation-states have routinely 
implemented cultural and linguistic policies in the effort to colonize group identities. In the 
post-Reformation state, religious doctrinal conformity was replaced by freedom of 
conscience, but only insofar as the values of the dominant culture allowed (Young, 1990). 
Citizenship thereby becomes an abstraction denuded of the emotional power of collective 
cultural claims (Kymlicka, 1995). The problem, then and now, becomes one of defining 
citizenship in the context of nation-states comprised of ‘constituent communities’ (Kymlicka, 
1994, 1995).  
In the Aristotelian conception, the purpose of education was to reproduce ‘the type of 
character’ necessary for the sustenance of a particular constitution (Walzer, 1983). The 
problem in plural societies resides in differing conceptions on what the constitution is or 
should become. ‘Democratic citizens may well disagree about what their children need to 
know’ (Walzer, p. 203). Further, the constitution ‘will probably require more than one 
character type; the schools will not only have to train their students, they will also have to sort 
them out; and that is bound to be a controversial business’ (Walzer, p. 197). By at least the 
start of the last century, progressive reformers promised equal educational opportunities in the 
industrialized West through the introduction of compulsory schooling. However, this goal has 
been undermined by such factors as residential segregation, inequitable funding mechanisms, 
the emergence of state-funded elite academies and the private option. Above all, not all 
students come to school equal in terms of access to cultural capital. ‘The formal equality 
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which governs pedagogical practice is in fact a cloak for and a justification of indifference to 
the real inequalities with regard to the body of  knowledge taught or rather demanded’ 
(Bourdieu, 1976, p. 113). In the Foucauldian (1977) sense, the ‘corrective technology’ used to 
sort and grade students reinforces historical power structures because the one-size-fits-all 
template hardwires social reproduction into the educational process. 
In one way or another, the question of in whose image citizens should be moulded 
stands at the forefront of education policymaking. Thomas Jefferson believed the sustenance 
of democratic institutions required an educated citizenry to monitor the actions of their 
representatives. He advocated three years of state-funded common schooling for all children, 
but they were to be divided into those destined for labour and those destined for learning 
(Adler, 1982). Both Dewey’s (1916/1966) participatory and Freire’s (1970/2007) 
emancipatory pedagogical models support the model of an active citizenry committed to the 
principles of equal rights and social justice. Plato on the other hand responded to the 
challenge posed by individualism to state cohesion (Bloom, 1968). In The Republic, his 
theoretical state is characterized by unity and stability since citizens are taught the twin 
virtues of loyalty and obedience. Indeed, nations have routinely charged schools with 
controlling the lower ranks of society. Horace Mann, for example, pioneered compulsory state 
schools grounded in the Prussian model of standardization and efficiency in order to solve 
problems attendant to immigration and industrialization. To a large measure, his project was 
animated by the desire to assimilate the mid-nineteenth century wave of immigrants to the 
United States. ‘[F]ears about cultural heterogeneity propelled the establishment of systems of 
public education; from the beginning, public schools were agents of cultural standardization’ 
(Katz, 1987, pp.18-19). To this end, state schooling was expanded, professionalized and 
brought under centralized control. 
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The prescriptions offered for the complexity of today’s cultural conflicts tend to 
ignore the fact that Western democracies do not mirror the homogenous city-states of classical 
Greece (Kymlicka, 1995). Though ‘modern, secular, industrialized, democratic, and 
consumerist civilizations’ resemble each other more and more in their liberal 
cosmopolitanism, they are becoming increasing culturally diverse (Kymlicka, p. 88). Liberal 
cultures are thin because what embodies the right and the good are not shared among all 
citizens. Social elites from one nation are likely to share core liberal values with similarly 
situated citizens from other nations (Walzer, 1994). However, policymakers steeped in liberal 
cosmopolitanism face difficulty managing demands for separate religio-cultural schools from 
thicker cultures within their national borders.  
Sundered civic bonds concern liberals, and the argument that cultural membership is 
already protected through the universal rights of citizenship implies an integrative project. 
Groups might, for example, remove their children from a state school system they perceive as 
corrosive to their core beliefs. At least from the standpoint of traditional liberalism, such a 
stance undermines notions of a shared bond of citizenship. Because today’s protagonists move 
within particular political and cultural contexts, there can be no single response to the problem 
of group demands. Yet all remedies must address the stubborn question of what forms of 
pluralism are commensurable with liberal political values. Speaking broadly, there are two 
general schools of pluralist theory. Because ‘objective moral facts do not form an internally 
consistent set but are actually in conflict’, ontological pluralism explains the durability of 
conflict as arising from disagreement about the facts undergirding world views. Epistemic 
pluralism on the other hand ‘asserts that there is no single comprehensive moral, religious, or 
philosophical doctrine upon which human reason converges’. Thus, the exercise of human 
reason may lead to ‘different and mutually exclusive, but nonetheless rational, answers to Big 
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Questions’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 60). While communitarians approximate the first category, 
Rawls’ (1993) political liberalism falls into the latter.  
Rawls idea of ‘comprehensive doctrines’, or moral belief systems, introduces ‘into 
people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise’ (p. 
xxvi). Rawls’ (1993, 1987) argument, which will be further clarified in Chapter 4, revolves 
around the plausibility of forging consensus on political matters between diverse groups. But 
‘critical pluralists’ and ‘difference democrats’ are suspicious of liberal consensus building 
models (Drysek & Niemeyer, 2006). Firstly, there is the chasm dividing the lived reality and 
worldview of marginalized groups from the experiences of dominant elites. Secondly, there is 
the problem of discursive mechanisms favourable to the powerful and privileged. For 
example, deliberative democracy’s appeals to consensus building might, in fact, be a device to 
confer legitimacy and stifle dissent (Young, 2000, 1996, 1990).  
At least at the elite level, the range of deep doctrinal disagreements in Western plural 
states has narrowed. This is the phenomenon Huntington (1996) terms the ‘Davos Culture’ 
after the broad set of assumptions shared by the attendees at the World Economic Forum (p. 
57). This includes, for example, agreement on the neoliberal principles underlying the 
Washington Consensus, a set of preconditions to developing countries in exchange for loans 
(Williamson, 1990). However, the process of decolonization illustrates the persistence of 
doctrinal divisions at deeper levels. Notwithstanding current pressures from new economic 
immigrants and political asylum-seekers, many industrial societies are coming to terms with 
the failure of the grandchildren of immigrants to assimilate. The familiar narrative of 
integration into the larger society, while struggling to maintain cultural practices, has been 
replaced by the second and third generation’s rejection of the animating principles of their 
liberal, secular birthplaces. Especially in terms of academic achievement, the dynamic is 
reflected in current European discussions concerning the scions of guest workers from Islamic 
26 
 
 
countries (van de Werforst, 2010). Yet, even in the United States, where the melting pot 
metaphor reigns, acculturation does not reflect reality within blighted urban cores or along the 
south-western borderlands. For groups that have been in the United States for many 
generations, the allure of the distant homeland still resonates. The few remaining cultural 
vestiges become amplified, a situation described by Ignatieff (1993) with Freud’s famous 
description of ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ (1929/2002). Though such symbolism 
might be dismissed as ‘play-acting’ (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 232), the attachment to heritage 
and culture, however distant and tenuous, underlies the attractiveness of a community to call 
one’s own beyond the thin veil of political community. 
In abstract terms, the extension of civil liberties and the protection of civil rights 
characterizes the Western formulation of political community. The cultural community on the 
other hand is one wherein members share a bond formed by at least one of the following 
markers: ‘language, religion, ethnicity, history and tradition. In fact two other items can be 
added to this list—nationality and race—because there are compelling arguments that these 
should be considered cultural or ideological phenomena rather than biologically determined 
groupings’ (Halstead, 1995, p. 258). Since education ‘cannot be exercised in a cultural 
vacuum’, the political and cultural domains converge, and tension naturally arises between the 
commitments learned at home and the values transmitted by the dominant culture at school. 
When intermingled with the majority, cultural maintenance, especially for orthodox groups, 
may require official recognition and institutionalized protections from the influences of the 
dominant culture. For minority groups whose identities are threatened by liberal modernity, 
education is nothing less than ‘a program for social survival’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 197). 
Liberal democratic regimes tend to manage religio-cultural pluralism in one of two 
different ways. Walzer (1992) distinguishes between what he terms Liberalism 1 and 
Liberalism 2. Liberalism 1 approximates the United States’ model whereby the state officially 
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maintains a neutral stance in regard to collective cultural aspirations, and reserves most 
protections for the rights of individuals. (There are exceptions in terms of positive 
discrimination and Native American tribal sovereignty.) Liberalism 2 approximates the 
French model whereby the state actively intervenes in the social sphere to preserve a certain 
‘cultural, linguistic or religious heritage’ (Walzer, p. 99). In theory, Liberalism 1 provides 
room for an educational system sensitive to pluralism. Rather than merely perpetuating the 
official culture, the system offers citizens the room to inhabit inherited collective identities. 
Though Liberalism 1 promises to afford children the freedom to make their own choices, 
cultural identity is nonetheless challenged by the liberal state’s civic theology and cacophony 
of opposing ideas. 
Cultural maintenance competes not only with the broad marketplace of ideas, but also 
the degree to which dominant cultural norms pervade the educational firmament. For 
example, even in a system as decentralized as that of the United States, where education is a 
state and local responsibility, schools display remarkable homogeneity in curriculum, 
pedagogical practices and social rituals. Walzer’s formulation of Liberalism 2—again, the 
French model— may sometimes grant collective rights, but religious minorities are still 
vulnerable to the same erosion of their fundamental beliefs due to ‘sustained exposure to 
liberal values or to a more direct assault by liberal social policy. What Western educationalists 
see as universal liberal values may well be seen by others as secular and reductionist’ 
(Halstead, 1995, p. 266). Since liberalism has both political and cultural dimensions, centrally 
directed state education almost invariably diminishes the ability of minority cultures to 
transmit their values and beliefs. This is especially true in terms of fundamentalists whose 
doctrinal adherence informs every facet of daily existence. However, there are limits to what 
cultural practices the liberal democratic state can reasonably be expected to tolerate. 
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Mill (1861/1972) believed it not in the state’s interest to repress conduct perceived 
sinful or wrong except when it does so to prevent harm. Locke (1685/1983) asserted that any 
person exercising his innate reason should accept citizens’ right to freely practice their 
religion if it does not infringe on the freedom of others to do the same. Many contemporary 
liberals believe this a matter of justice and fairness. According to Rawls’ (1987, 1993) 
contractarian argument for toleration, citizens converse across conflicting ‘comprehensive 
doctrines’. Therefore, there must be rules of civility embedded within the constitutional 
framework, which mandate tolerance and equal respect for all. But there is a paradox to 
toleration: People only tolerate something to which they object (Walzer, 1997). A more 
symmetrical arrangement occurs when institutional arrangements encourage peaceful co-
existence between different groups in relationships animated by respect. This requires an 
agreed-upon set of values; and, as will be clarified, the values commonly used as a societal 
adhesive favour liberal, rights-based individualistic cultures rather than those managing 
autonomy for collective ends.  
Liberalism holds that the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both 
analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or the nation or the 
religious group; analytically, because such entities do not really efface the separate 
reality of individual lives; normatively because the recognition of that separateness is 
held to be a fundamental fact for ethics, which should recognize each separate entity 
as an end and not as a means to the ends of others (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 62). 
 
Thinkers in the communitarian vein (e.g., Sandel, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Walzer, 1994) 
believe liberalism espouses an exaggerated belief in individual identity, ignoring the 
constitution of the self through the psychological depth of cultural ties, ‘the way that 
individual values are formed in social contexts and pursued through communal attachments’ 
(Kymlicka, 1989a, p. 883). According to this school, the traditional liberal strategies of 
privatizing identity conspire against equal opportunity because neutrality tends to reinforce 
traditional power relations (e.g., Young, 1996, 1990; Modood, 2005). These thinkers believe a 
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nation’s institutions and policies should make provisions for the cultural fabric of its 
constituent communities. Conversely, a uniform educational policy constitutes ‘cultural 
invasion’, wherein ‘the invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group’ and impose 
their own worldview (Freire, 1970/2007).  But states are challenged when ‘strong religious 
bonds and emblems’ drive groups away from participation in national life (Smith, 1991, p. 7). 
This is particularly evident when elements from within the political establishment, sometimes 
abetted by outside actors, create centrifugal forces inimical to social cohesion. Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq are but recent examples of ‘hard cases’ where the discourse 
required for civil society falters because citizens, with the encouragement of ethno-political 
entrepreneurs, are unable to set aside differences. Here, subgroups construct the aggressively 
insular communities of ‘siege cultures’ (Bash, 2001). Since ‘liberalism generates a politics 
that renders its own requirements for legitimacy unsatisfiable’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 59), the rapid 
exposure to democratic institutions in developing democracies might aggravate this dynamic. 
For Rawls (1993), deep sectarian divisions like those of religion can only be managed 
by a shared commitment to individual rights and liberties. For Kymlicka (1994, 1995), a 
liberal defence of minority rights rests on the belief that individual freedom is linked to group 
membership. Group-specific rights provide a means of promoting equality between the 
minority and the majority. Indeed, historical examples suggest social pluralism can be allied 
to imperatives for state cohesion through systemic group stabilization. The Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires afforded their subjects a dual identity—one to their nation state, another to 
their ethnic and cultural identity. Rulers exercised restraint in asserting linguistic and cultural 
hegemony over their multi-ethnic subjects. Through ‘the millet system’, Ottoman 
administrators dealt with representatives from each cultural group separately (Kymlicka, 
1992, 1994). 
30 
 
 
Though basic human rights are typically extended to individuals, they are formulated 
and actuated in communal transactions that reference religio-cultural allegiances. Therefore, 
‘true equality’ means redressing disadvantages in the cultural marketplace through differential 
treatment sensitive to differential needs. Of these rights, none are more important than 
language. The language used in schools is vital in transmitting ‘associated traditions and 
conventions to the next generation. Refusing to provide public schooling in a minority 
language almost inevitably condemns that language to ever-increasing marginalization’ 
(Kymlikca, 1995, p. 111). Special rights, then, compensate for unequal circumstances. Rawls 
makes a similar argument regarding group rights in that justice necessitates negating ‘morally 
arbitrary’ disadvantages, especially when these are ‘profound and pervasive and present from 
birth’ (1971, p. 96). At base, equality requires ‘freedom from domination’ (Young, 2000). 
For Barry (2002), the civil and political rights arising from the French and American 
Revolutions do not answer the problem of equality and ‘need to be supplemented by 
universalistic social and economic rights’ (p. 12). To this end, Rawls (1993) endorsed 
classical rights of liberal citizenship, but supplements his understanding of justice with a 
formulation of equality in the ‘difference principle’; namely, that society be first configured to 
improve the well-being of the least advantaged socio-economic groups. ‘Organizational and 
economic inequalities’ are permitted ‘so long as these improve everyone’s situation’ (Rawls, 
p. 282). This might justify, for instance, compensatory actions such as positive discrimination 
or the allocation of greater resources for schools serving disadvantaged populations. For 
Kymlicka (1995), group-specific rights, including educational autonomy, find support in 
liberal theory because equality can only be preserved through protection from majoritarian 
decision-making. Such a version of group rights is consistent with distributive egalitarianism 
in maximizing aggregate welfare. 
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Liberal thought from Mill to the present stresses that our ideas about the good life are 
fallible and subject to revision. In the liberal democratic state, the provision of free access to 
information advertises alternative modes of living and provides individuals a means of living 
outside of themselves, so as to question and revise life ends. Yet the freedom to make 
meaningful choices also involves a distinct cultural component, since it is ‘only through 
having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options’ 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83). For this reason, cultural membership constitutes a primary good, 
something to which people are reasonably entitled (e.g., Kymlicka, 1994, 1995; Taylor, 1994; 
Young, 1990, 1996). Divorce from the religio-cultural context constitutes ‘a profound harm’ 
because this diminishes the range of an individual’s life options, reducing ‘one’s very ability 
to make meaningful choices’ (Kymlicka, 1994, p. 25).  
On some levels, the terms of the debate between individualists and communitarians 
may be misinformed. Political liberals tend to neglect the group rights model of toleration. 
Rawlsian liberals assume the individual rights model as the only alternative to civil strife and 
ignore that religious communities peacefully coexisted in the Ottoman Empire ‘long before 
England’s Toleration Act’ (Kymlicka, 1994, p. 40). While Rawls’ (1993, 1987) model 
protects individual rights by separating church and state, the group rights model conjoins the 
two. The aforementioned millet system legally recognized diverse religio-cultural traditions as 
distinct groups with self-governing status (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 35). This system endured 
almost five centuries before collapsing after the First World War. Though limitations were 
placed on inter-marriage and taxes required in lieu of military service, non-Muslims exercised 
self-government, obeyed ‘their own laws and customs’ and could run their own schools 
(Kymlicka, p. 36). Kymlicka labels this a ‘hyper-communitarian model based on group rights’ 
(Kymlicka, p. 53). Though humane for its time, the construction limited civil liberties taken 
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for granted today. For instance, there was no right to dissent within the constituent 
communities.  
There are many present-day examples of legal pluralism. Throughout the Americas 
and Oceania, First Peoples exert autonomy through tribal self-government and hunting and 
fishing rights. Canada and the United States afford exemptions from compulsory education 
laws to children from certain religious communities. From the Baltic to the Mediterranean, 
linguistic rights to national minorities means EU-sanctioned educational autonomy in the 
form of separate schools. Russian schools in the Baltic Republics, Danish schools in 
Germany, Italian schools in Slovenia and Hungarian schools in Slovakia and Romania 
indicate a commitment to group rights which generates little controversy. Beyond the scope of 
language rights, however, minorities may seek protection ‘not only from external opposition, 
but also from internal dissent, and this often requires exemption from the constitutional or 
legislative requirements of the larger society’ (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 39). In this case, special 
rights create special dilemmas. 
The problem with group exemptions is that liberalism, as commonly understood, 
ultimately cares about how political rights create opportunities for free decision-making. 
Strict forms of legal pluralism such as the millet system threaten individual autonomy and 
efface individual identity. Liberals would have problems with the millet system’s internal 
restrictions on liberty of conscience. And strict legal pluralism might constitute social 
dynamite, since ‘a situation in which groups live in parallel universes is not one well 
calculated to advance mutual understanding or encourage the cultivation of habits of 
cooperation and sentiments of trust’ (Barry, 2002, p. 88).  
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2.3  Summary 
The previous section described how social pluralism presents ontological challenges to 
state-sponsored schooling in the liberal democratic state. Traditional responses to the fact of 
pluralism include privatizing religious and philosophical difference. However, the 
construction of a national identity under the banner of political liberalism provides an avenue 
for dominant groups to rally allegiance and stifle dissent (Young, 1996, 1990; Modood, 
2005). For example, the focus on headscarves in state schools through anti-veiling laws in 
France, Belgium and some German states heralds a shift away from multicultural policies 
towards a ‘new emphasis on shared citizenship and civic integration, whose backdrop is a 
perceived failure of Muslim integration’ (Joppke, 2007b, p. 336). In the French example, the 
secularization of the public sphere occurs within the historical context of tension between the 
Republic and the Catholic Church (Kerr, 2007). But what appears a reassertion of political 
liberalism in public spaces also provides a means for dominant cultural groups to deliberately 
quarantine and undermine specific minority groups (Laborde, 2005). To this end, ‘the nation-
state has in fact appropriated an increasing amount of culture; with its very own way of 
classifying and interpreting reality’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 56). The millet system on the 
other hand sanctioned groups in their collective pursuit of the good. This institutionalization 
of difference suggests a means to afford group rights, but at the expense of weakening 
individual rights and development.  
 
2.4  The Neoliberal Challenge 
Schumpeter’s (1943) point of departure in defining democracy involved ‘the 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (p. 269). Liberal 
democratic principles are, of course, more than procedural. For example, there are the 
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ontological realities of a constitutional framework formalizing the location of power for social 
elites—a ‘façade constitution’ whereby political institutions are not committed to defending 
fundamental laws (Lowenstein, 1957; Sartori, 1962). Because elections may merely legitimate 
governments that have learned to control the outcomes, there must be actuated components 
that together preserve human rights and dignities. These include deference to fundamental or 
inalienable rights in a social contract where citizens’ obligations are agreed upon and 
understood. The exercise of government power must be checked by overarching institutional 
safeguards. Democracy, after all, is not a default condition. At base, it is a civic discourse 
whose success is contingent upon balancing individual and group rights within the fundament 
of a stable polity in which citizens have achieved some level of economic and physical 
security. Because democratic principles must be supported and sustained indigenously, the 
polity is simultaneously contractarian and future-oriented. And, at least since Dewey 
(1916/1966), schools have been explicitly charged with shaping the dispositions required for 
democratic citizenship. Primary among these were the cooperative modes of decision-making 
necessary for ‘community life’. Today, this basic understanding of democracy has come 
under attack as globalization replaces ‘the universal ethics of the human person’ with those of 
the marketplace (Freiere, 1998, p. 114).  
When Fukuyama (1989) foresaw ‘the universalization of liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government’ (p. 4), the future of cooperative modes of decision-making 
looked promising. But the heady days of post-Cold War triumphalism proved fleeting. The 
intervening years have witnessed atavistic religio-cultural self-assertion, including war and 
terrorism. The fears and anxieties of globalization filled the ideological void left by 
communism. Globalization implies a multiplicity of changes relating to the integration of 
political and economic systems worldwide (Levitt, 1983), with the result that the ‘world 
becomes smaller each and every day. We see it turning into a global village’ (McLuhan, 1964, 
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p. 93). These tendencies accelerated as human and financial capital became transnational free 
actors, and policymakers in established democracies linked neoliberal economic policies with 
imperatives for democratic transformation abroad (Abrahamsen, 2000; Davies & Issitt, 2005). 
Recent failures, including those of the post-communist ‘third wave’ and Western nation-
building projects, suggest liberal democracy requires a set of cultural preconditions and values 
(Huntington, 1979, 1991).  
Within every state there are forces antagonistic to the core value of tolerance needed 
for stable democratic governance. These forces, notably the politicization of ethnicity and 
religion, are energized through the process of democratic political transformation (Carrothers, 
1999). Yet even within mature democracies (e.g., Canada, Spain and Belgium) identity 
politics call for a reconfiguration of liberal democratic principles around the question of group 
rights. Furthermore, the nature of global market competition has pressurized the foundational 
institutions of the nation-state—religion, family and community. In response to today’s 
precarious economic climate, a tendency exists for citizens to retreat to their private interests 
and focus on financial security (Putnam, 1995, 2000). Familiar totems and traditions provide 
refuge from rapid social upheaval. Despite the reality that ‘the world has become tightly 
bound together in a single economic system with instantaneous communication between 
different sectors of the globe’, cultural and political boundaries increase (Basch, Schiller & 
Blanc, 1994, p. 29). Though geographic boundaries no longer regulate cultural exchange, 
‘cultural differentiation within national societies is rising’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 58).  
Political culture includes common arrangements for shared decision-making and 
accountability. Developing the character necessary to uphold these principles underpinned 
Dewey’s (1897) idea of education as ‘the fundamental method of social progress and reform’ 
(p. 93). Accordingly, the common good in a deliberative democracy could only be sustained 
through the maintenance of healthy local institutions. ‘The assumption was that if the 
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decision-making institutions of a community were left untended, all or most might suffer’ 
(Wolin, 2008, p. 138). Hayek (1944/1994) and Friedman’s (1962/2004) belief that political 
freedom depends upon economic freedom departs from this idea. 
Whereas classical liberalism represents a negative conception of state power in that 
the   individual was to be taken as an object to be freed from the interventions of the 
state, neoliberalism has come to represent a positive conception of the state’s role in 
creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws and institutions 
necessary for its operation (Olssen, 1996, p. 340).    
 
Were it not for the durability of the Thatcherite and Reaganite projects, the terms of 
today’s discussion would be different. The resultant increase in inequality engendered through 
market-based policies energized social stratification and disintegration (Barry, 2002, 2005; 
Friedman, 2005). Declining birth rates, the dissolution of the welfare state and the fluidity of 
human and financial capital produced a climate wherein ‘the liberatory potential’ of 
democracy and capitalism grew stronger (Wells et al., 2002, p. 344). A new ‘political 
imaginary’ asserted itself, whereby political actors and citizens became habituated to ‘an 
antipolitical culture of competition rather than cooperation, of aggrandizement, of besting 
rivals, and of leaving behind disrupted careers and damaged communities’ (Wolin, 2008).  
The market metaphor signals a paradigmatic reconfiguration of power relationships. 
Whether evidenced through direct outsourcing to private interests or a state-funded array of 
elite schools, market competition raises key questions about the role of schools and other 
public institutions in a deliberative democracy. Technologies of control, notably a mass media 
wedded to corporate interests, create conditions for political cynicism and demobilization. 
These technologies ‘camouflage a deeply manipulative politics’ with the effect that state and 
corporate power become amalgamated (Wolin, 2008). The fusion of democracy with market 
principles renders government the guarantor of property interests, a role which conspires 
against ‘the development of a fully inclusive democratic public which can command the 
service of its government for truly democratic ends’ (Sehr, 1997, p. 59). Instead of viewing 
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social problems as challenges to solve, they become profit-making opportunities for private 
capital. This tendency is aided and abetted by an indifferent citizenry. ‘In contemporary 
capitalist democracies there is almost no civic participation apart from voting, and even 
voting turnout is low’ (Torres, 2013, p. 368). The turn away from civil society and muted 
resistance to the transfer of public resources to private hands bodes poorly for the future of 
deliberative democracy.  
Today, schools and other public institutions supportive of a shared political culture are 
discredited and dismantled by deliberate design (Apple, 2001). The ‘state is faced with a very 
real crisis in legitimacy’ when identifiable groups chronically underperform relative to their 
more affluent peers. Schools become standard-bearers for the problem, and a manufactured 
crisis shifts blame away from governing elites to teachers. This strategy minimalizes problems 
of chronic poverty, inequitable school funding, racism and lack of access to higher education. 
In short, the state exports the ‘crisis outside itself’ (Apple, p. 416). In this light, the clamour 
on the part of dominant economic groups for accountability and market freedom, including 
closing schools with ‘failing’ test scores or low graduation rates, represents a Trojan horse 
approach toward implementing market-oriented policies in the name of educational reform.  
Markets ‘are said to be natural and neutral, and governed by effort and merit, and 
those opposed to them are branded as opposed to effort and merit. Particular kinds of students 
with particular characteristics are accepted, and particular kinds of students are found 
wanting’ (Apple, 2004, p. 413). The supposed objectivity of testing presumes a uniform 
ability and thereby sanctions ‘initial cultural inequalities’ (Bourdieu, 1976, p. 113). This 
process reproduces social elites by way of the phenomenon of ‘rationalization’, a 
systematized selection to perpetuate ‘the system that has made them possible’ (Wolin, 2008, 
p. 164). Market freedom in the cause of educational equity has proven fictive in practice 
(Bowe & Bold, 1992). Through curricular standardization and accountability mechanisms, 
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educational markets reproduce social divisions (Bernal, 2005; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; 
McNeil, 2000). Market-based policies favour established groups wielding economic and 
political power.  
To train students to assume the same positions on the social hierarchy as their parents, 
schools legitimize social reproduction behind the meritocratic veneer of fair academic 
competition (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977; Bowles & Gintis 1976). Because the professional 
and managerial classes depend upon schools to ensure their children’s entry into the elite, 
schools transmit and assess this strata’s customs, behavioural norms, cultural preferences and 
ways of speaking (Olneck, 2000). Consequently, the elite’s ‘embodied cultural capital’, that 
learned primarily in the familial sphere, becomes institutionalized as the social standard 
(Bourdieu 1973/1986). Though purportedly neutral or difference-blind, rules of exchange 
strategically position affluent children for academic success at the expense of those lacking 
the cultural capital formally referenced and assessed at school. Consequently, social frontiers 
of exclusion become self-perpetuating constructs with cognitive and symbolic dimensions. 
The conceptual link between problems of identity and inequality are clarified in the 
use of school metrics that stratify along predictable class lines in assigning ‘merit-based’ 
rewards. Thus, curricula and assessments become reflective of the socially constructed 
experiences of dominant classes. Thus, marginalized groups are subject to an ‘alienating 
rhetoric’ in which elites ‘impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and 
inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression’ (Freire, 1970/2000, p. 152) 
Though it must be noted that the internal diversity of minority cultures resists reduction to 
clearly identifiable markers, these types of interchanges help explain why certain groups, at 
least through a Western lens, de-emphasise academic achievement (Barry, 2001). Since their 
culture is de-legitimized in the school setting, subgroups might contest a game without 
knowledge of its rules. Without possessing an entry ticket in the form of ‘embodied’ cultural 
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capital, low SES students face considerable obstacles in obtaining ‘institutionalized’ cultural 
capital—formal certifications of knowledge such as degrees and exam results (Bourdieu, 
1976). Instead of neutrally distributing rewards, the assessment-based metrics at the heart of 
the neoliberal project privilege the socially advantaged. It is their definition of intellectual 
capital being taught and assessed.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
The rhetorical strength of civil liberties has been appropriated into a civic discourse 
sanctifying consumer choice, material acquisition and competition as the polity’s animating 
principles. This conceptual coupling is not new. Locke (1689/1988), after all, had placed the 
right to property on par with political freedoms. However, the cultural vacuum left by the 
purportedly neutral hand of the market, favours the norms and values of the dominant culture. 
Today, the power and penetration of late capitalism explains a global monoculture which 
dilutes the strength of minority cultural totems and traditions. ‘Production and distribution of 
mass culture are controlled largely by transnational companies not bound to specific 
locations’ (Dijkstra et al., 2001, p. 59). The lack of competition to this stateless ideology 
introduces new layers to the discussion of historical inequities in education. The reduction of 
more and more human transactions to the dictates of the market occurs against a backdrop 
accented by the retreat of social justice concerns from political agendas in the last three 
decades. Indeed, as inequality becomes rationalized as a permanent feature of Western life, it 
has become fashionable to blame the disadvantaged for their condition.  
Equal rights and opportunities do not translate into equal outcomes because of 
differentiated starting positions (Bourdieu, 1973, 1976; Friere, 1970/2007). As school culture 
reproduces the zero-sum principles at the heart of competitive market economies (e.g., 
Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; McNeil, 2000), contemporary educational systems retain practices 
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where rewards are disproportionately distributed to those from the dominant culture (e.g., 
Apple, 1979, 1982, 1993; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). The curricula of most state schools, 
consciously or not, preserve an uneven societal playing field, reinforcing the dichotomy 
between the high status knowledge of the upper classes and the low status knowledge of 
minorities and other marginalized groups (Bourdieu, 1973). This sets the stage whereby ‘the 
markers of taste become the markers of people. The school becomes a class school’ (Apple, 
1993, p. 223). Not only does the hidden hand of the market produce inegalitarian outcomes in 
terms of placing certain religio-cultural groups at an academic disadvantage, but, as formerly 
referenced, the state actor’s entanglement with majority norms and values undermines its 
function as a neutral arbiter of rights and implementer of policy. This is a powerful 
convergence. How this catalyst affects the discussion will be explained in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: The Problem of Liberal Neutrality and Cultural Identity Schools 
 
3.1 Definitive Issues 
This chapter explores the problem of state neutrality with respect to cultural identity 
schools. Historically, liberals have seen in neutrality an antidote to cultural difference. As 
mentioned previously, neutrality has become a central justificatory principle in implementing 
market-based solutions to social problems. Here, I discuss three stances to the question of 
financial support to cultural identity schools. Traditionally, liberal states exercise ‘benign 
neglect’ in reference to comprehensive moral-philosophical questions, that is, religio-
philosophical beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad (Rawls, 1971, 1993). For Young 
(1990, 1996), claims of state neutrality constitute a ‘myth’ to mask elite political dominance. 
For Kymlicka (1989a), the dominant culture erases any pretence of neutrality since it infuses 
nationhood in areas such as language, holidays and school curricula. In fact, the selection of a 
postage stamp or the design of public buildings almost invariably reference a particular 
cultural backdrop. The presence of these cultural artefacts, however, does not preclude the 
state actor from adopting a policy of ‘even-handedness’ to the problem of pluralism (Carens, 
2000). The challenge, then, becomes one of developing a position which respects both 
cultural identity and the sanctity of liberal values, an intermediary position Bader (2003) 
terms ‘priority for democracy’.  
The standard liberal device of privatizing identity affords the cultural norms of the 
majority with the sanction of the ‘neutral’ public realm (Modood, 2005; Young, 1990). 
Neutrality may be inclusive in the sense that it allows minorities the right to ‘pursue their way 
of life as they see fit; but it may also be a device for exclusion, via strengthening the 
necessary particular boundaries and sense of collective self of the group that so excludes’ 
(Joppke, 2007a, p. 314). Far from approaching a position of equal respect to difference, the 
42 
 
 
‘deracialised discourse’ of policymakers can replace concerns about injustice and inequality 
with ‘racist constructions’ of ‘the nation’ and its ‘common culture’. The usual measures of 
student achievement complement this dynamic because they focus on the attainment of 
particular standards, ‘regardless of disparities between different groups of students (based on 
factors such as social class, gender and ethnic origin)’ (Gillborn, 1997, p. 350). Thus, the 
preservation of subgroup vitality requires commitment on the part of the state actor to a 
genuinely inclusive model. Once more, this is an important state responsibility because 
affirmation of cultural membership constitutes a primary good, a human right to which all 
people are reasonably entitled (Kymlicka, 1989a, 1993). 
Most contemporary understandings of political liberalism privilege the status of 
individual autonomy. Essentially this means that democratic citizens have the ability to chart 
the moral course of their own lives (Rawls, 1971). As previously noted, the liberal emphasis 
on individualism was not always so clear (Kymlicka, 1989b, 1995). In the nineteenth century, 
freedom of conscience applied to the rights of individuals to worship in communities. As in 
the classical sense, the individual was defined by her community affiliation. However, in the 
post-War period the protection of individual rights moved to the forefront. The application of 
contemporary human rights standards recognizes the importance of community, but adds 
emphasis to the protection of the individual from her community. A consensus formed around 
the proposition that contingencies of birth should not subject individuals to what constitutes, 
at least from a liberal perspective, oppression from cultural collectives. This primacy of 
individual rights harkens back three centuries to the Enlightenment doctrine favouring the 
moral worth of individual agents. But the position contains the built-in paradox that if an 
individual becomes divorced from her culture, the array of her available life choices 
diminishes. Choice involves a complexity of cognitive processes which access a particular 
cultural context and web of experience (Kymlicka, 1995).  
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The autonomy-based liberal package accommodates a wide array of conceptions of the 
good. Though liberal political values do not encompass all religious values, they may, as will 
be amplified, not necessarily stand in opposition either (Kekes, 1995). The goal of liberal 
morality is that people live amicably within the public sphere while maintaining their own 
moral framework within the private sphere. Thus, public liberal morality and private cultural 
or religious morality can be complementary. The problem arises in the relationship between 
liberal morality and minority collectives. Since political liberalism commands that each 
citizen must respect the civil liberties of others, inconveniences arise when dominant groups 
refuse to acknowledge the significance of minority cultural assertions in matters such as the 
wearing of head scarves in public spaces. Legal-political symbolism of this type does not 
really address deeper concerns of how to engage groups who are not only convinced that their 
ultimate truth must be adhered to by members of their own community, but should set the 
moral standard for all citizens. Even a minimal liberal morality threatens some groups 
(Kymlicka, 1995; Strike, 1993).  
Liberal theory supports the idea of the state creating conditions for groups to 
promulgate their version of the good, so long as the civil liberties of their members are 
protected. The state is responsible for directly delivering goods conducive to the common 
good, including collective security, infrastructure, healthcare and education. Education ideally 
creates the conditions whereby citizens form and reconsider values inherited by cultural and 
familial contexts. Traditionally, education was perceived a public good that should be 
delivered with public monies. In terms of neutrality, then, the question arises of whether 
cultural identity schools should be entitled public monies.  
In the three sections that follow, I briefly outline potential responses to the problem of 
state neutrality with respect to cultural identity schools.  
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3.2 Strict Prohibition to Funding Cultural Identity Schools  
This first stance finds liberal neutrality incompatible with cultural identity schools. 
These schools can be tolerated but cannot receive state support. Consequently, parents must 
use their own funds to send their children to these institutions. This argument rests on the 
premise that in plural democracies the doctrinal contours of the good life have a private 
meaning, so state schooling must be neutral in questions of the good (Strike, 1991). Thus, 
financial support would equate with state endorsement. 
At least at the distinction between the right and the good, values are broadly seen as 
the province of the family unit. This line of thought confuses the introduction of values with 
the reception of values. In other words, values themselves are perceived as having an 
indoctrinating character with the end that group specific agendas are supported. The logic of 
this argument rests on the premise that controversial versions of the good life have no place in 
school. On the other hand there is a conceptual link between education and liberal autonomy 
(Gutman, 1987). For example, practitioners of critical pedagogy examine competing value 
systems toward the end of developing moral autonomy. But should parents be asked to accept 
moral autonomy as a goal? More pointedly, should parents be forced to expose their children 
to ways of thinking and manners of living inimical to their conception of the good?   
 
3.3 Requirement to Fund Cultural Identity Schools  
In the second stance, state support of group-specific schools is seen as an implication 
of state neutrality. In ostensibly neutral state schools, cultural values, customs and traditions 
invariably infuse educational processes. For this reason, parents should be free to select 
schools for their children based on group-specific criteria (Galston, 1995). A state that does 
not tolerate group-specific schooling violates the principle of separation of church and state. 
The same principle applies government sanction of group-specific education, but refusal to 
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pay for it. The latter position forces the economically disadvantaged parents to attend state 
schools, whether they want to or not. A state which tolerates group-specific schools must be 
consistent and pay for these schools.  
This stance assumes parents have the general right to educate children in accordance 
with their own religio-cultural values. To extend the argument, the maintenance of distinct 
cultural groups requires that children be protected from conceptions of the good contrary to 
their familial beliefs. Certain inconveniences exist within this logic. This stance suggests no 
value education aimed at moral and philosophical autonomy, no confrontation with 
philosophical diversity, no familiarization with controversial versions of the good and no 
confrontation with philosophical expressions or activities which are contrary to the beliefs of 
the parents. Because value education must solely be a family prerogative, state schools are 
charged with an impossible task: The transfer of neutral knowledge and skills. However, 
striving toward a one-size-fits-all schoolhouse creates the conditions for a ‘low doctrine’ 
learning environment, motivated by the principle of causing the least offense to the largest 
number (Holmes, 1992).  
Because educational practice is mediated by teachers and students, it cannot be 
insulated from societal currents and controversies. For this reason, this stance suggests that 
the state must pay for group-specific schools, but the design and interpretation of what is 
taught and how is entirely left for parents and communities.  
 
3.4 Financing of Cultural Identity Schools can Occur only if Liberal-Pedagogical    
      Conditions are Satisfied  
The third stance argues that liberal neutrality requires state financing of cultural 
identity schools, but with certain contingencies. The idea that cultural groups cannot assume 
some control over schooling for their children assumes a too-restrictive and too-individualistic 
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definition of primary values. If one accepts the premise that the autonomy to make life 
decisions rests on accessing one’s cultural context (Kymlicka, 1989a, 1995), group-specific 
schools preserve a fundamental human right. Since cultural membership constitutes a primary 
good, the state does not have the ultimate right to make decisions about educational choice, as 
this would constitute an intrusion upon the rights of parents and communities. Culturally 
distinct societies should receive financial support, ‘but only if, and in so far as, they are 
themselves governed by liberal principles’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 153). If liberal principles are 
not transgressed, parents are entitled to select a state-funded educational environment 
supportive of what is learned at home. In a broad sense, education signifies both an initiation 
into a particular cultural membership and entry into national citizenship.  
This stance assumes two essential stages in education. First, children are initiated into 
a conception of the good reflective of their cultural membership. At this stage there are 
reasons for group-specific education. Later in their development, emphasis is placed on the 
cultivation of the capacities and virtues which encourage people to form their own critical 
conceptions of the good independent of cultural group orthodoxies (Halstead, 1995). Seen in 
this manner, group-specific education need not preclude the development of the critical 
capacities for autonomous decision-making in a liberal democratic state. Both liberal-
pedagogical influences and a particular cultural ethos inform educational practice. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
According to the third stance, state support for cultural identity schools rests on their 
conformity to political liberalism, a position that will later be developed in terms of ‘priority 
for democracy’ (Bader, 2003). For this to occur on a national level, there must be an agreed-
upon framework from which diverse groups derive both their definitions of human rights and 
motivations to safeguard them. The required intercultural consensus could include groups not 
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conditioned to Western ‘rights talk because human rights take different forms in different 
cultures’ (Taylor, 1999). Thus, cultural identity schools might engage in substantive value 
education without violating liberal tenets. As will be further elaborated, these schools add 
value to the educational system because they provide alternatives to the prevailing movement 
toward neoliberal policies. The state actor’s function within such a system would be to ensure 
that the transfer of cultural values takes place within parameters respective of human rights 
and liberal values. The next chapter details strategies consistent with this understanding. 
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Chapter 4: Consensus-Building Models 
 
4.1 Definitive Issues 
This chapter explores the functional steps necessary for achieving a consensus-based 
framework that reconciles individual and group rights. The viability of cultural identity 
schools requires a policy architecture fashioned through on-going dialogue between all 
stakeholders. Answers to the problem of education in the plural state require sensitivity to the 
psychological depth of cultural attachments and folkways in ways not captured through 
centralized curricula and management. As such, any model for cultural identity schools 
demands a commitment to fairness on the part of the state actor. Also, state support requires 
that schools respect commonly understood principles of human rights.  
In both formal and informal terms, state schools engage in an enormity of complex 
and often contradictory functions. To various degrees, they serve as mediating fora: Safe 
havens where children re-examine the doctrines and commitments inherited from religio-
cultural communities (Kerr, 2007). However, manifestations of state paternalism face 
opposition from ‘hard cases’ threatened by a civic ideology transmitted by a professional 
corps of teachers whose backgrounds and beliefs differ radically from their own. Efforts to 
locate consensus between schools and cultural communities revolve around the definition and 
application of curricula stressing competencies such as national identity, social justice, 
tolerance, multiculturalism and human rights (e.g., Kubow et al., 2000). But variations on the 
global village metaphor, so common in today’s school mission statements, cannot erase the 
paradox that state education, especially in an era of data-driven accountability, exerts 
downward pressure upon minority groups. The singular focus on the testable—the narrowing 
of ‘knowledge transmission’—validates dominant cultural capital and devalues the 
importance of minority cultural constructions (Au, 2007). Positivist and managerial 
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approaches explain ‘a narrower curriculum’, one which emphasizes ‘test-based instruction 
that ignores critical real world skills, especially for lower performing students; and to less 
useful and engaging education’ (Darling Hammond, 2004, p. 18). 
There is little incentive to enrol students whose perceived test scores negatively 
impact an institution’s reputation or imperil its existence (McNeil, 2005). The desire to 
deviate from the body of testable material, so as to accommodate linguistic and cultural needs, 
must contend with possible negative consequences, including loss of funding, declining 
enrolments and closure. The current ideological climate creates and sustains the structural 
conditions for frontiers of exclusion, and since minority groups tend to comprise marginal 
political constituencies, they are disadvantaged in the policymaking process relative to 
questions of what is taught and by whom. On the other hand an education standardized 
through majoritarian decision-making theoretically provides subgroups with the skills and 
strategic understanding to access opportunities in their new homelands. Without some level of 
mediation, the alternative of strictly separate, culturally-specific training represents a potential 
recipe for parochialism and intolerance.  
In arguing for parental choice over mandated enrolment at ‘government schools’, 
Chubb and Moe (1990) identify democratic politics as the central problem facing schooling. 
Majoritarian decision-making means ‘winners getting to exert their right to use public 
authority to impose their policies on the losers’ (Chubb & Moe, p. 28). In their view, school 
choice protects minority interests since power devolves from central authority to local 
stakeholders. As a result, community members gain the political efficacy to affect policies 
best suited to their particular needs. Schools benefit through an active and involved 
constituency—parents and students attach directly to the life of the school. At least in broad 
terms, the emphasis on local involvement over bureaucratic edict allies the idea of school 
choice with contemporary civil society theory (Putnam, 1995, 2000). Seen in this way, school 
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choice supports diverse networks of local voluntary associative structures over the alternative 
of regional or majority dominance of the policymaking process or the metrics favoured by 
neoliberal school reformers.  
The model of Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) links the configuration of 
diverse cultural and national identities within the psychology of individual citizens through 
simultaneous commitments to divergent cultural identities (Kubow et al., 2000). Rawls (1971, 
1987, 1993) deploys the idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ in developing a set of principles 
prescribing the bounds of politically permissible discourse. Citizens set aside ideological 
beliefs and adopt a common vocabulary anchored in ‘public reason’, a set of foundational 
principles to which all can agree. The model provides a theoretical pathway toward harmony 
and cooperation on matters pursuant to the common good. Kymlicka’s (1989a, 1995) 
narrower ‘autonomy-based’ model offers groups protection in maintaining their traditions and 
beliefs. His idea of multicultural citizenship does the most to contain the problem of ‘hard 
cases’, but at a risk to social cohesion due to the risk of a vertical alignment of separate 
cultural entities. Groups might also co-exist peacefully within a national border through 
simply agreeing to leave each other alone. Bader’s (1999, 2003, 2007) model of 
nonconstitutional pluralism (NCP) echoes much of Kymlicka’s thesis. However, he bridges 
the gap between cultural determinism and democracy by demonstrating how limited legal 
pluralism strengthens associative democracy and softens fundamentalist stances. The four 
frameworks detailed here provide the basis for a comparative theoretical and empirical 
template with which to gauge the utility of Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) ‘consociational’ 
response to pluralism, the subject of the following chapter. 
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4.2 Multidimensional Citizenship 
The knowledge, skills and attitudes underpinning citizenship education have long been 
contested. Analysis of citizenship education in Australia, Britain and Canada suggest that 
national and provincial curricula submerge the critical understanding necessary for ‘citizen 
empowerment’ under orthodox agendas of cultural hegemony (Davies & Issitt, 2005). For 
example, there appears a reluctance to critically engage relations with indigenous people and 
minorities or question official versions of national history. There is also the problem 
concerning the relevance of centuries-old definitions of citizenship created to legitimate 
fledgling nation states (Bottery, 2003). Today, the focus on citizenship education in the 
developed world may simply have shifted from a concern with national identity—discerning 
oneself from ‘the other’—to one of encouraging national competitiveness in the global 
economy (Walker, 2000).  
In the European context, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 8) that went into effect in 1993 
broadened the compass of citizenship through granting European Union citizens free 
movement within the EU as well as political participation in local and EU elections. Against 
this backdrop, the Council of Europe’s Education for Democratic Citizenship Project seeks to 
create responsible and informed citizens. In light of the rapid changes wrought by identity 
politics, the influence of corporatism, immigration and the diminishment of the welfare state, 
the Project attempts to simultaneously promote local civic capital while conferring a 
transnational identity and a concern for human rights to EU citizens. Yet, as Audiger (1998) 
notes, Education for Democratic Citizenship faces challenges in application: 
Even though human rights and democracy are shared references, they are expressed in 
particular state, national and cultural constructs. This situation, that we are constantly 
recalling, makes it particularly difficult to define the common framework necessary 
for activities intended to promote and support EDC (p. 6). 
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The question becomes one of whether the conceptual framework for European citizenship, 
rooted in Enlightenment precepts, provides the breadth to accommodate increasingly 
heterogeneous populations, including millions of third country nationals permanently resident 
in the EU (Hansen, 1998). Further, there are issues of residual distrust arising from millennia 
of conflict and the unresolved problems posed by the relationship between European and 
national identity, an issue implicit to Turkey’s bid to join the EU (Naval, Murray & Veldhuis, 
2002).  
 The nine-nation consensus-building approach for ‘multidimensional citizenship’ 
(MDC) (Kubow et al., 2000) offers an alternative to the Western cosmopolitanism of the 
‘Davos culture’. In this conception, schools are charged with developing critical and systemic 
thinking skills while ‘being sensitive to traditional values’ and local cultural considerations 
(Kubow et al., p. 135). Panellists from Asia, for example, favoured ‘the inclusion of notions 
of explicitly moral, ethical and spiritual elements’ within their understanding of citizenship to 
a greater extent than did their European and North American colleagues (Kubow et al., p. 
134). There was agreement that specific courses or ‘exhortations to behave properly’ are 
ineffective if other social factors impacting the lives of students do not reinforce MDC. In line 
with classical political thought, the decision-making processes learned in school and 
community should develop students with the disposition and skills to become advocates for a 
just society. Against the backdrop of an ‘increasingly interdependent’ world, citizenship is 
thereby defined through allegiance to ‘overlapping communities—local, regional, national 
and multinational’ (Kubow et al., p. 137). Though the panellists recognize tension between 
regional and global allegiances, they posit that multiple identities can be reconciled.  
One of the aforementioned hallmarks of globalization has been the remarkable 
resilience of local and regional identities premised in geography, language, religion and race. 
Demands rooted in identity politics for secession or devolution challenge even advanced 
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democracies; for example, the taut divisions between Belgium’s Flemish and Walloon 
communities or intermittent eruptions from Quebecois for greater autonomy from Canada. 
MDC’s idea of the harmonious coexistence of multiple identities answers these frictions 
through providing a framework reconciling commitments posed by culture and country. 
The task is not to dismiss the claims of patriotism and national identity but to ensure 
that citizenship education also includes the realization that we live in an 
interdependent world and that nations, and the communities within them, must work 
together if the challenges of the 21st century are to be successfully overcome (Kubow 
et al., p. 138). 
 
To be sure, the reality of ‘multiple identities’ creates inner turmoil for individuals and may 
lead to ‘hard choices’ (Kubow et al., p. 139). What is required is a capacity to develop what 
Hanvey (1976) calls ‘perspective consciousness’, the understanding that one’s worldview is 
not universally shared, that it is fluid and dynamic, and that others make sense of the world in 
profoundly different ways. This involves the ability to understand other cultures with an 
insider’s perspective. In the context of increasing cosmopolitanism, this suggests that 
individuals have a full menu of options, not merely a choice between their childhood culture 
and that of the larger society.  
In contemporary Japan, a modern culture simultaneously exists within the scaffolding 
of traditional values, especially in terms of industrial relations (Satsuki, 2002). For citizens to 
understand that they are not defined by only one identity, EDC initiatives encourage schools 
to discuss and value forms of diversity within their enrolments. For these programmes to have 
effect, requires that they extend beyond the physical confines of schools and provide students 
with cross-cultural experiences. For students to recognize and understand ‘overlapping 
identities’, partner schools, exchange visits and correspondence might be arranged. 
The normative appeal of EDC theory must ultimately be balanced with praxis. Since 
the framework’s competencies result from intercultural consensus, we are confronted with the 
potential for curricular dilution and reductionism. More specifically, these competencies 
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threaten a value-neutral, ‘low doctrine’ curricula supportive neither of critical reflection nor 
dialogue (Holmes, 1992). Of course, it should be added that any educational program relies 
more on the commitment of teachers charged with its implementation than on the program’s 
theoretical robustness. Some work from the field provides encouragement. 
Over 200,000 students followed an EDC curriculum, Project Citizen, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina shortly after the Balkan Wars. ‘Active teaching methods’ by which students 
monitored current events, voiced their opinions, engaged in research and worked 
cooperatively were the strongest predictor of future political engagement. With the exception 
of this curriculum generated by an U.S. foundation, the Center for Civic Education, ‘all three 
groups [Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs] used separate textbooks with different versions of 
history’ (Soule, 2002, p. 4). According to Soule’s (2000, 2002) survey of participants, the 
curriculum proved a ‘significant predictor’ for increases in political efficacy and interest in 
terms of measures of intention to vote or participate in citizen action. However, scales of 
political tolerance saw no statistically significant rise (2002). Since ethnic homogeneity has 
increased since the Balkan conflicts, political tolerance faces obvious obstacles when 
undermined at the familial and community levels. 
 
4.3 Rawlsian ‘Overlapping Consensus’ 
An egalitarian critique of liberalism reads that ‘the defence of liberty is a defence of 
the privileges of people with wealth or status’ (Lehning, 2002, p. 201). Rawls answers this 
charge by adjudicating between the poles of liberty and equality in creating the normative 
framework for a society premised on ‘justice as fairness’ (1971). The first element of this 
principle conforms to the post-Reformation state’s idea of equal civil and political rights for 
all citizens. The second element sets out to erase disadvantages of birth and status by 
replacing equality of opportunity with the distributive concept of justice contained in ‘equality 
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of fair opportunity’. In accord with ‘the difference principle’, social inequalities should only 
exist if they privilege the most disadvantaged. The original position from which these 
principles are derived begins behind the theoretical ‘veil of ignorance’. In essence, individuals 
enter the world without knowledge of their social status, familial wealth, connections and 
personal attributes. From this position of limited information, Rawls proposes that one would 
rationally opt to join a society favouring the distributive mechanisms of ‘equality of fair 
opportunity’. The original position, then, relates to the fair conditions by which to situate 
parties. From this position, citizens would support rational dialogue and just answers that can 
be endorsed by all citizens. 
Rawls (1993) later confronts the problem posed by the fact of social pluralism. ‘How 
is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, 
who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ 
(Rawls, p. 4). These doctrines result from the normal ‘exercise of human reason’ within free 
institutions. Their ‘comprehensiveness’ derives from a coherent set of principles that inform 
adherents’ worldviews and decision-making processes in all facets of their human experience. 
‘A society united on a reasonable form of utilitarianism or on the reasonable liberalisms of 
Kant or Mill’ requires oppression because these philosophical positions conform to the 
comprehensive philosophical nomenclature (Rawls, p. 37). Rawls seeks to safeguard both 
social stability and individual freedom by excluding comprehensive doctrines from the arena 
of political debate: ‘no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a 
constitutional regime’ (Rawls, p. 137). 
What is needed is a regulative political conception of justice that can articulate and 
order in a principled way the political ideals and values of a democratic regime, 
thereby specifying the aims the constitution is to achieve and the limits it must respect. 
In addition, this political conception needs to be such that there is some hope of its 
gaining the support of an overlapping consensus, that is, a consensus in which it is 
affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive 
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over generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of 
justice is that political conception itself (Rawls, p. 1). 
 
To form this ‘political conception of justice’, requires citizens to avoid political decisions that 
others cannot ‘reasonably be expected to endorse’, the ‘principle of public reason’. This 
conception is freestanding, that is, independent of the divisive identities and communal 
attachments from which comprehensive doctrines and their conceptions of the good are 
derived. 
Rawls’ theorizing is limited to what he calls the ‘domain of the political’ and its 
values. ‘The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the 
political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and familial, which are affectional, again in 
ways the political is not’ (1993, p. 137). An ‘overlapping consensus’ exists when citizens 
agree on ‘principles of public reason’, even as they disagree about ideological issues. 
Movement towards consensus begins with modus vivendi arrangements, which might result 
from groups strategizing out of Hobbesian survival. When citizens learn the ‘political virtues’ 
of ‘toleration and mutual respect, and a sense of fairness and civility’, these compromises 
evolve into the discursive foundations for first ‘constitutional consensus’ and finally 
‘overlapping consensus’. 
…once a constitutional consensus is in place, political groups must enter the public 
forum of political discussion and appeal to other groups who do not share their 
comprehensive doctrine. This fact makes it rational for them to move out of the 
narrower circle of their own views and to develop political conceptions in terms of 
which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public so as to 
put together a majority. As they do this, they are led to formulate political conceptions 
of justice. […] These conceptions provide the common currency of discussion and a 
deeper basis for explaining the meaning and implications of the principles and policies 
each group endorses (Rawls, 1993, p. 165). 
 
By way of institutional arrangements operationalized around ‘the common currency of 
discussion’, the principles of political justice become ingrained in the social structure and 
over time provide the basis for an enduring ‘overlapping consensus’. 
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The idea of a society characterized by ‘fair cooperation over generations’ requires 
reasonable citizens to develop the civic tongue necessary for participation in deliberative 
decision-making. At its most elemental, this means that citizens do not try to impose their 
comprehensive doctrine on others. An inconvenience is the fact of social groups espousing 
‘unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines’, which Rawls presumes 
will always exist (p. xvii). Fundamentalist religions are especially problematic because they 
introduce ‘into people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of 
compromise’ (Rawls, p. xxvi). In the interest of avoiding ‘mortal conflict’, these unreasonable 
citizens must—‘like war and disease’—be contained (Rawls, p. 64).  
Forcing citizens to at least partially compromise their comprehensive doctrines, 
highlights two potential problems with Rawlsian liberalism. First, the constitutional 
arrangement lacks durability since groups conform out of necessity, not because they want to. 
As a result, they might strategize until they have a majority with which to impose their will on 
others. Second, Rawls’ argument for reasonable pluralism is ‘comprehensively liberal’—not, 
as he claims, purely ‘political’ (Talisse, 2005, p. 64). Because a ‘reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine’ presumes a commitment to ‘liberal-individualistic values’, it is, in fact, 
‘prototypically liberal’ (Barnhart, 2004, p. 264). Rawls’ requirement to suspend one’s core 
principles for the purpose of social tranquillity is as comprehensively liberal as the 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ espoused by the consequentialism of Kant or the utilitarianism of 
Mill. 
In order to accommodate such a move, a comprehensive doctrine must cede authority 
to what the individual behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ would choose in regard to 
political matters. It must concede its lack of authority in some area of life. A 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine is, in short, either a comprehensive liberalism or 
not a comprehensive doctrine in the sense of being comprehensive (Barnhart, p. 265). 
 
The question of whether an illiberal comprehensive doctrine can actually be expected 
to cede to political liberalism in the public realm may be overstated. Politically liberal 
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societies tend to be culturally (if not comprehensively) liberal, in that groups are allowed to 
adopt non-conforming and unpopular beliefs and actions. Even if these groups exert little 
influence on the body politic, they enjoy significant liberty in pursuing their own version of 
the good. And even if they do not morally ascribe to political liberalism, the liberal polity 
allows them to intentionally isolate themselves from the greater society. But isolation cannot 
be absolute, and exposure to another tradition may cause a group to look outside itself and 
modify its practices (Walzer, 1990; MacIntyre, 1988). In fact, Rawls (1993) makes a similar 
claim. Through the exercise of ‘liberty of conscience’, political values fuse to values intrinsic 
to a group’s comprehensive doctrine. Citizens’ views, therefore, can be bifurcated into the 
comprehensive and political, ‘suitably related’ (p. 140). 
Rawls’ (1993) political conception of justice purportedly functions as a freestanding 
element, one independent of any comprehensive doctrine. He claims the neutrality at the 
epistemological core of this conception works to join the allegiance of different 
comprehensive doctrines. Barnhart (2004) responds that such allegiance would instead arise 
from ‘an abstraction out of some, presumably local, comprehensive doctrine’. A conception 
‘thin enough’ to gain adherence from diverse comprehensive doctrines would be denuded of 
any meaning and rendered ‘uninterpretable to the point of uselessness’ (Barnhart, pp. 272-
273). In the sphere of education, this interpretation raises the spectre of an aggregation of 
platitudes masquerading as moral commitments (Holmes, 1992). For MacIntyre (1988), 
interpretations of justice cannot be freestanding, but require a particular tradition or cultural 
context as a moral anchor. According to Walzer (1994), a ‘thick’ morality is rooted in 
religion, custom and tradition, whereas a ‘thin’ morality strives for ‘universality’ and defines 
its terms broadly. For Rawls’ political conception of justice to have any utility beyond a 
slogan would ‘require thickening’ and, in a plural framework, this creates controversy and 
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conflict. This is not to say that Rawlsian conceptions are antithetical toward a framework for 
cultural identity schools.   
Taylor (1999) finds promise in the application of Rawlsian overlapping consensus to 
groups with divergent comprehensive doctrines. Though he uses a similar consensus-based 
model, he broadens the orbit. Rawls examines the idea of overlapping consensus in terms of a 
liberal conception of justice within a particular society, while Taylor’s intent is to show how 
an overlapping consensus might be achieved in and around international human rights. 
Though particular features of ‘rights talk’ have roots only in Western history, the expression 
of human values by different cultural traditions manifest differently. 
…what we need to formulate for an overlapping consensus are certain norms of 
conduct. There does seem to be some basis for hoping that we can achieve at least 
some agreement on these norms. One can presumably find in all cultures 
condemnations of genocide, murder, torture, slavery, as well as of, say, 
‘disappearances’ and the shooting of innocent demonstrators (Taylor, p. 125). 
 
An unforced consensus on human rights would arise when each group has its own way of 
justification from out of its profound background conception. They would agree on the norms, 
but disagree on why they were the right norms, and they ‘would be content to live in this 
consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief’. Sometimes there 
will be ‘alternative, mutually incompatible justifications’ (Taylor, pp. 124-125).  
                
4.4 The Communitarian Correction 
Advanced democracies routinely appeal to the principle of toleration in managing their 
diverse cultural and philosophic strands. A more robust vision of community goes beyond 
toleration to describe a social order marked by free choice and joined together by obligation: 
‘historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment 
to one another and some special sense of their common life’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 62). On the 
national level, this arrangement suggests an amalgam of distinct communities flourishing 
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under a political umbrella ‘that is neutral of particular cultures or forms of power’ (Bounds, 
1994, p. 370). The ‘communitarian correction’ of liberalism modifies the totally ‘neutral 
liberal state to better permit the flourishing of different traditions’ while affording a means to 
prevent groups from violating fundamental civil liberties. Simply put, ‘liberalism checks the 
conservative or exclusive tendencies of communitarianism, and communitarianism checks the 
rootless tendencies of liberalism’ (Bounds, p. 370). This formulation assumes a rights-based 
language privileging ‘voluntary association, pluralism, toleration, separation, privacy, free 
speech, and so on’ (Walzer, 1990, p. 14). 
Liberalism cannot provide ‘neutral standards’ as the lynchpin for consensus between 
different traditions because the Enlightenment model itself constitutes a distinct, ‘albeit 
defective’, tradition (MacIntyre, 1984, 1988). Its lack of a coherent moral culture produces a 
climate inimical to the connective tissue of community. Today, liberal thought’s abstract 
emphasis on individual freedom and universalism has translated into a metaphor for the 
market economy, especially involving procedures consolidating hegemonic power structures. 
The attempt to step outside liberalism and adjudicate between rival traditions involves what 
MacIntyre (1988) calls ‘fictitious objectivity’, since interpretations of justice and rational 
inquiry are inextricably bound to particular traditions that provide the rational basis for 
thoughts and actions. For this reason, educational practice cannot opt for difference-blind 
neutrality, but must either choose between competing traditions or adopt a pluriform platform. 
‘Education issues in a set of skills and preferences; it is as much a process of deprivation as of 
enrichment’. In regard to moral education, ‘which has always been a central role of 
schooling’, schools endorse and justify a set of moral values and have a hard time delineating 
between public and private morality (Crittenden, 1994, p. 295).  
 During a period when ‘modern states become increasingly heterogeneous and their 
citizens hold ever more divergent and incompatible identities, ideals, and interests’, basic 
61 
 
 
moral values informing life choices are increasingly incommensurable with each other 
(Bellamy, 1999, p. 1). Through dismantling collective structural and ideological frameworks 
against which individual choices are made, liberal autonomy militates against cultural groups 
thriving and flourishing within a single moral culture. Because culture implies a closed 
system, little moral basis exists for a uniform system of schooling. Instead, a constellation of 
different schools and educational approaches would best respect the plural state’s range of 
philosophic and cultural diversity. The state would provide funding and some level of 
regulation. Walzer (1990) and MacIntyre’s (1988) understandings of intercultural dynamics 
provide hope for increasing levels of cooperation between different tradition in this 
arrangement. Walzer proposes a process undergirded by ‘real talk’ through which individual’s 
received ideas and theories are critically challenged and, through a process of reflection, 
differences between traditions bridged. Through these interchanges, MacIntyre sees the 
possibility of traditions evolving toward greater openness.  
Liberal states protect group members from communities that impose moral 
commitments on them, what Kymlicka (1995) calls ‘internal restrictions’. But policies 
referencing liberal autonomy implicitly sanction the destruction of group members’ ability to 
make individual choices accessing robust cultural traditions ‘to make sense of all the different 
pieces of their social life’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 319). However, choice may hold little meaning 
for economically vulnerable citizens. ‘What is the value of choice, if choice must be exercised 
in a social environment, such as the Hobbesian environment of some U.S. cities, in which 
there is little that is worth choosing?’ In this context, an illiberal regime which assures some 
level of economic security and protects ‘the everyday liberties’ of its citizens, ‘might 
legitimately be judged to satisfy the universal minimum better than some weak liberal 
regimes’ (Gray, 1995, p. 82).   
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Kymlicka (1989a) observes that some communitarian thinkers assume ‘society rests 
on an artificial social contract’, a notional sense of the common good, ‘with a coercive state 
apparatus needed to keep naturally asocial people together in society’. However, freedom of 
association actually encourages people ‘to naturally form and join social relations and fora in 
which they come to understand and pursue the good’.  
The state is not needed to provide the communal context and is likely to distort the 
normal processes of collective deliberations and cultural development. It is 
communitarians who seem to think that individuals will drift into anomic and detached 
isolation without the state actively bringing them together to collectively evaluate and 
pursue the good (Kymlicka, p. 904).  
 
The state may become progressively stronger the more dissociated citizens become, ‘since it 
will be the only or the most important social union’ (Walzer, 1990. p. 16). The common good, 
then, involves an aggregation of interests in pursuit of individual and group flourishing. 
Group-differentiated rights were part of liberal theory and practice in the nineteenth 
century and during the interwar period, and the focus on individual rights a recent 
phenomenon. Group rights formerly incorporated a large range of liberal commitments and 
reflected the role of empires in suppressing minority groups’ national aspirations in places as 
diverse as Finland and Macedonia. In opposition to contemporary liberalism, cultural 
membership was not treated as a purely private matter. ‘On the contrary, liberals either 
endorsed the legal recognition of minority cultures, or rejected minority rights not because 
they rejected the idea of an official culture, but precisely because they believed there should 
be one official culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 54). For Kymlicka, the problem is that 
contemporary liberal doctrines make little provision for the question of group rights. The 
traditional recourse to majoritarian decision-making processes ‘render cultural minorities 
vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, and exacerbate ethno cultural 
conflict’ (Kymlicka, p. 5). To afford protections on a group basis, Kymlicka attaches a theory 
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of minority rights to traditional human rights principles. The defence of minority rights rests 
on the belief that individual freedom is linked to group membership.  
To frame the problem of group rights, Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between two 
broad types of cultural diversity. First, there are ‘national minorities’ resident within a 
‘multinational state’. These are previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultural 
groupings. They wish to recapture some semblance of autonomy and are concerned about 
their survival as a distinct society. Francophone Quebec represents one such example. Second, 
there is the case of cultural diversity resultant from individual and familial immigration to a 
‘polyethnic state’. This type of cultural diversity tends to not enjoy the protections accorded to 
the former. Western democracies display increasing polyethnic characteristics. ‘Guest 
workers’ who were brought to Europe as temporary help during the post-War boom years 
have become permanent residents, as have their children and grandchildren. They are now 
joined by political and economic refugees. There are calls for greater recognition of their 
religio-cultural identity; with the desire to achieve this not through separation, but through 
modifying legal and institutional instruments. 
Until the nineteen seventies, the United States, Canada and Australia followed what is 
termed the ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of immigration. This model affords immigrants the 
right to maintain their cultural heritage in the private sphere. It does not involve the 
establishment of ‘institutionally complete societal cultures alongside the Anglophone culture’ 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 78). In recent years, pluralistic policy has shifted to recognize the 
importance of customs and traditions to immigrant communities. In Canada, this is often 
referred to as the mosaic model (Kymlicka, p. 14). In contrast, the United States follows a 
civic model of integration, requiring that immigrants ‘not only pledge allegiance to 
democratic principles, they must also learn the language and history of their new society’. 
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Civic nations differ from ‘ethnic nations’ because they allow for anyone to integrate into the 
common culture, ‘regardless of race or colour’ (Kymlicka, p. 24). 
 
4.5 Nonconstitutional Pluralism  
There has been a tendency to respond to the problem of cultural diversity in one of 
two ways. There are those who support ‘accomodationalism’ or ‘structural pluralism’, and 
there are those who favour ‘separationism’ or ‘civil libertarian liberalism’. Bader (2003) 
believes these camps ignore the ‘full, reciprocal relationships between society-culture-
politics-nation-state-and (organized) religions’. Beyond sanctioning group difference, states 
should formally incorporate religio-cultural groups within the political process and as social 
service providers. This stance stands in opposition to ‘the individual-state-market-framework’ 
where religion is privatized (p. 266). According to Bader, difference-blindness fails, not only 
for the practical consideration that no state can be completely neutral, but because strict 
neutrality towards religio-cultural pluralism does not meet its own criteria of fairness. Strict 
neutrality ‘would literally strip people and institutions of all cultural particularities, histories, 
religious traditions and practices’ (p. 267). Taken further, the ‘radical’ removal of religious 
rationale (nomos) from public debate and politics is ‘morally arbitrary, unfair, and practically 
counterproductive’ (p. 265). Not only does such a framework hinder fundamental freedoms of 
expression, but it establishes a double standard through sanctioning secular groups and 
organizations motivated by a host of business or ideological interests. Instead of ‘hands off’ 
neutrality, fairness requires ‘even-handedness’ on the part of the state actor to all participants 
in the political process (Carens, 2000). 
Bader’s (2003, 2007) idea of ‘nonconstitutional pluralism’ (NCP) adopts a position of 
‘relational neutrality’. Unlike the difference-blind approach, which has difficulty managing 
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the influence of (unofficial) state religio-cultural bias, relational neutrality addresses structural 
asymmetries (Bader, 1999, 2003, 2007; Carens, 2000).  
Many feminists insist on a rigorously individualistic, secularist interpretation of 
human rights, particularly religious freedom. They fiercely attack all ‘group rights’, 
particularly any associational or collective autonomy for religions, and they proscribe 
all separate codes or systems of religious law, while insisting on a ‘uniform civil 
code’. This strategy ‘solves’ the problem by denying it. The upshot of such a strategy 
is, of course, that it will work in favour of majorities and majority religions (Bader, 
2003, p. 278). 
 
As Young (1990) and Modood (2005) have also observed, difference-blindness tends to 
legitimate majority bias under the guise of ‘neutral public rules or modern professional 
requirements’ (Bader, 2003, p. 280). In opposition, NCP addresses minority disadvantage 
through a corporatist power-sharing relationship.  
Co-existence and cooperation require empirically tested strategies that recognize the 
‘nonideal’ presence of serious social inequalities which ‘have not been adequately dealt with’ 
(Bader, 2003, p. 266). To satisfy ‘institutional requirements of public debate and democratic 
decision making’, relational neutrality calls for religious groups to contest issues in the public 
realm. In this way, groups are ‘integrated in the political processes of problem-definition, 
deliberation, presentation of decision alternatives, and decision making’ (Bader, p. 269). 
Because access to the political process affords groups the legal means to protect their 
interests, NCP provides a safety valve that ‘may also help to prevent the development of 
religious fundamentalism in politics’ (Bader, p. 272). Neither strict church-state separation 
nor Rawls’ (1993) idea of defusing (or avoiding) divisive issues through appeals to public 
reason find support here. Neither strategy affords a clear avenue for disadvantaged minority 
groups to address inequality. 
Democratic participation means religious minorities play a crucial role in mobilizing 
to address inequality, and it should be recalled that many Western civil rights movements 
were faith-based. That religious organizations are consulted on contested issues lays at the 
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crux of NCP. In this way, the model nurtures and protects the associative structures 
underlying civil society and encourages engaged citizenship at the local level through ‘a fair 
amount of actual decentralization and de facto autonomy to decide on specific issues’ (Bader, 
2003, p. 269). Institutional machinery consistent with NCP is evident in a variety of countries, 
including Belgium, India, Austria and Germany. Unlike the negative freedoms and non-
intervention stressed by strict church-state separation, in these nations organized religions 
play an important role in social services, including education and healthcare. Faith-based 
organizations receive state subsidies. Freedom of religion, therefore, is conceived in terms of 
associational freedom. The participation of Christian democratic parties at the national and 
EU levels provide an example of how religious views may be tempered to appeal to broad 
constituencies. In terms of whether it is a good idea for religious groups to provide social 
services, Bader (2003) cites public trust theory, which states that groups authorize state 
regulation in return for accepting public money.  
 
4.6 Discussion 
This chapter elaborated on how moral and legal justifications for cultural identity 
schools, like religious freedom, must be balanced with other rights, notably non-
discrimination and equal opportunity through dialogue and, finally, agreement on rules. In the 
face of the increasingly heterogeneous nature of Western societies, group-rights consensus-
based frameworks insist upon the right of all to be heard. Kubow et al.’s (2000) 
multidimensional conception of citizenship captures how globalization’s creolization of 
identities informs the interior landscape of citizens. Along these lines, Walzer (1990) and 
McIntyre (1988) hint at the gradual impact of intercultural interactions on the principle of 
toleration. In Rawls’ (1993) idea of overlapping consensus, the bounds of political debate are 
proscribed by a set of ‘reasonable’ principles. In Taylor’s (1999) idea of an unforced 
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consensus, parties forge agreement from drawing upon deeper culturally-based epistemic 
roots. Bader’s (2003) idea of nonconstitutional pluralism operationalizes a policy framework 
around this idea. Since difference-blindness is inconsistent with associational freedom, the 
state adopts a stance of relational neutrality to financially support religio-cultural associations. 
In exchange, these associations protect the fundamental freedoms of their members. 
Negotiation and bargaining in the political arena moderate illiberal tendencies. 
Whatever the means, the success of any consensus-based framework depends upon the 
social context. Societies with deeply-rooted liberal democratic traditions require different 
approaches than those where recent histories of violence stalk ethno-cultural and religious 
lines. Further, the nature of the power structures defining the relationship between majority 
and minority groups provide important considerations. In the next chapter, I will attempt to 
systematize these and other challenges through analysing the consociational model (Lijphart, 
1968a, 1969, 1985). 
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Chapter 5: The Consociational Model  
 
5.1 Definitive Issues 
This chapter explores how consociational theory addresses the challenge of conjoining 
liberal democratic values and national cohesion with the model of a national system of 
cultural identity schools. Lijphart’s (1968a, 1969, 1985) framework embeds strategies 
referenced in the previous chapter in a robust historical example. The theory is grounded in 
the rise and fall of pillarization in the Netherlands. In a nutshell, vertical group segmentation 
built fences between neighbours of competing ideological persuasions. At the same time, 
political processes and informal agreements protected group integrity. The historical model 
offers both an immediate means to manage contemporary fundamentalist groups and a 
gradualist avenue for their integration into the body politic.  
The political good ‘no matter how important, can never in general outweigh the 
transcendent values—certain religious, philosophical and moral values—that may possibly 
come into conflict with it’ (Rawls, 1988, p. 275). But the plural state’s cacophony of cultural 
and social cleavages need not condemn nationhood to a patchwork of city-states or 
autonomous regions. The example of the Netherlands suggests a middle ground where 
national and cultural allegiances coexist in relative harmony. However, when viewed with the 
benefit of a longer historical arc, there are abundant examples of mature democracies 
descending into demagoguery and violence when fissures between rival traditions and 
philosophies erupt. In the plural state, the likelihood of violent religio-cultural conflagration 
might be a question not of if but when. If democratic values are to be enduring and penetrative 
of the body politic, there must be institutional remedies. ‘The inference to which we are 
brought is that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in 
the means of controlling its effects’ (Madison, 1787). 
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One factor supporting the liberal democratic state’s durability resides in its 
multiplicity of associative groups (Tocqueville, 1835/2000). For not only do these networks 
condition citizens in modes of democratic thought and action, they guard against a unification 
or imbalance of political power. Yet there are dangers, too. Self-contained or parallel societies 
threaten ‘a situation conducive to sharp disagreements, extremist behaviour, and the 
possibility of disintegration’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 6). The social segmentation of what 
Rousseau (1762/1997) called ‘partial societies’ may distort the general will, since small 
groups might be coerced by larger groups to suppress minorities. Theoretically, hyper-
pluralism prevents the usurpations of a large group. ‘A greater variety of parties and interests 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens’ (Madison, 1787, p. 61).  
The liberal democratic state’s heterogeneity conflicts with the Aristotelian ideal of a 
society composed of equals and peers. Lijphart (1968a) asks ‘how many and how deep 
differences can a democracy endure before approaching the danger zone of dissension, revolt, 
and dissolution (p. 4)?’ In the context of Western Europe, there are two important social 
cleavages. First, party politics reflect religious divisions in countries with sizeable Catholic 
populations, including Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Here, traditional wedge 
issues such as gay rights and abortion shape ideological fault lines distinguishing Christian-
based political parties from their secularist cohorts. But increasing secularization and the 
primacy placed by party constituents on economic over moral issues has caused these 
divisions to abate over the last four decades. Today, an expanding Muslim population figures 
in the formation of a new religious cleavage, albeit one with little political power. The second 
significant social cleavage, a dynamic evident in all Western European countries, comes in the 
form of regional groups interested in defending their identities. This ‘center/periphery’ or 
‘cultural-ethnic’ cleavage results from tensions between the centralizing forces of the nation-
70 
 
 
state and groups seeking various forms of autonomy (Lijphart, 1999). Though separatist 
movements have all but abandoned armed struggle in Western Europe, bloodshed 
accompanying ethno-cultural cleavages plague much of the developing world. 
In the post-War West, political theory has long asserted that national harmony is best 
facilitated by societies horizontally structured through ‘overlapping memberships’ (Truman, 
1951; Bentley, 1955; Almond, 1956), what has become known as ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ 
(Lipset, 1960). Thus, when cleavages are cross-cutting, and not reinforcing, pluralism need 
not be incongruent with democracy. The conditions for moderation and consensus on both the 
mass and elite levels are thereby facilitated by shared or overlapping interests.  
The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are  
enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, 
politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the 
population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in 
reducing the intensity of political conflict (Lipset, 1960, pp. 88-89). 
 
‘In the long run a complex society may experience revolution, degeneration, and decay. If it 
maintains its stability, however, it may do so in large measure because of the fact of multiple 
memberships’ (Truman, 1951, p. 506).  In other words, the ‘puzzle of stable democracy’ is 
solved by centrifugal forces (social cleavages) ameliorated by the existence of centripetal 
forces (cross pressures) at the mass level (Andeweg, 2000, p. 510). Consociational theory runs 
counter to these propositions. 
 
5.2 The Model 
The theoretical basis for consociationalism originates from Almond’s (1956) typology 
of Western democratic systems: Anglo-American, Continenetal and that of the Scandinavian 
and Low Countries. ‘Almond’s typology derives its theoretical significance from the 
relationship it establishes between political culture and social structure on the one hand and 
political stability on the other’ (Lijphart, 1969, p. 207). Lijphart revises Almond’s typology to 
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include nations ‘fragmented into political subcultures, that is, pillars—the familles spirituelles 
of Belgium and Luxembourg, the zuilen of the Netherlands, and the Lager of Austria’. When 
Lijphart (1968a, 1969) originated consociational theory, all these nations had vertically 
cleaved political subcultures, yet enjoyed high levels of social stability. 
According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low 
Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided from each other by 
mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobilism and instability. But they 
do not. These deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies will be called 
‘consociational democracies’ (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211). 
 
In these ‘deviant cases’, the behaviour of political elites enhances stability. Subgroup leaders 
refrain from competitive behaviour and make ‘deliberate efforts to counteract the 
immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation’ (Lijphart, p. 212). ‘The 
essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional 
arrangement as the deliberate effort by the elites to stabilize the system’ (Lijphart, p. 213). 
They understand the dangers of political fragmentation.  
Lijphart (1968a, 1968b, 1969, 1999) cites the Dutch case as contrary to the 
crosscutting cleavages proposition, claiming segmentation between non-inclusive groups can 
provide social stability. The nation ‘is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social 
cleavage…on the other hand, Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful 
democracy’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 1-2). In opposition to what Lijphart (1999) later calls 
Westminster or majoritarian democracies, consociational democracies eschew competitive or 
majoritarian decision-making. Instead, Dutch politics was a politics of accommodation. In 
areas where little consensus existed, accommodation was used to settle differences. 
Deliberations between ‘self-contained blocs’ sought pragmatic solutions, including those of a 
deep religious character. Though comprehensive political consensus was absent, minimal 
consensus existed in the sense of ‘weak and narrow’ consensus around ‘the crucial component 
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of a widely shared attitude that the existing system ought to be maintained and not be allowed 
to disintegrate’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 103).  
The effectiveness of the approach was contingent on bloc leaders’ ability to reconcile 
serious disputes in ‘a largely non-consensual context’. Cross-cutting cleavages at the mass 
level were replaced by ‘overarching cooperation at the elite level’. ‘Consociational democracy 
means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political 
culture into a stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1977, p.1). There were two further explanations for 
stability in Dutch political culture. First, a sense of nationalism pervaded all blocs. Despite the 
country’s egalitarian sensibilities, there has never been a serious republican movement against 
the monarchy, the House of Orange. Secondly, the ‘mutually reinforcing’ nature of religious 
and class cleavage meant religious pillars were made up of all social classes (Lijphart, 1968a). 
When a high degree of group differentiation exists, segmental autonomy ‘can be more 
conductive to stable democracy than a high incidence of overlapping affiliations’ (Lijphart, 
1968a, p. 200). For example, a dual balance of power might encourage competition for 
resources and recognition since ‘the temptation to shift from coalition to competition is bound 
to be very great’ (Dahl, 1966, p. 337). But the existence of many distinct subgroups thwarts 
dangerous competition since no one group can expect majority status. In a consociational 
democracy, ethnic, social, cultural, religious or linguistic divisions are ameliorated by the 
‘cooperative attitudes and behaviour’ of bloc leaders. These attitudes are formalized through 
guaranteeing, in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, group representation. To this end, 
proportional representation and a multiparty system strengthen the possibilities of 
accommodation.  
In terms of institutional characteristics, two attributes define consociational 
democracy—grand coalition and segmental autonomy. Grand coalition, which implies a 
power-sharing arrangement, means subgroup leaders govern the country jointly. Segmental 
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autonomy means that decision-making is delegated to the separate segments as much as 
possible. Proportionality is the basic consociational standard of political representation, civil 
service appointments and the allocation of public funds. Veto power guarantees minorities 
will not be outvoted by a majority when their vital interests are at stake (Lijphart, 1985). For 
social stability to be present in some sectarian contexts, ‘the realistic choice is between 
consociational democracy and no democracy at all’ (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238).  
 
5.3 The History 
Fifty years of Dutch history, roughly 1917 to 1967, provide the inductive 
underpinnings to consociational theory. Deep religious and class divisions separated distinct, 
isolated and self-contained population groups. Social communication across class and 
religious boundary lines was minimal. Each group had its own organizations such as political 
parties, sports clubs, labour unions, employers’ associations, farmers’ groups, newspapers, 
radio and television outlets and schools. The groups comprised four different social segments, 
or pillars (zuilen), representing Catholics, Protestants, Liberals and Socialists. Differentiation 
alone is not enough for pillarization; the definition references the comprehensiveness of 
separate social organizations. ‘[T]he blocs lived side by side, as distinctly separate subcultural 
communities, each with its own political and social institutions and with interaction and 
communication across bloc boundaries kept to a minimum’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 70). Separate 
social spheres helped ensure peaceful cooperation among the pillars (Bax, 1988). This system 
managed coexistence between incompatible comprehensive doctrines through keeping 
‘ideological renegades’ at bay (Kruijt, 1957).  
The roots of consociational democracy formed in the Netherlands during the period 
from 1878 to 1917. Three divisive issues confronted the blocs. First, the demand for public 
monies for state schools; second, the demand for the extension of the franchise; and, third, the 
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demand by labour for collective bargaining rights. The Education Act of 1806 ‘established a 
virtual monopoly of religiously neutral schools’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 105). Private schools 
could be established only by special decree, which were infrequently granted. Later, in 1857, 
private schools could be funded, but without state financial support. 1878 marks the beginning 
of the struggle by the religious blocs for this support. In 1917, a compromise was reached 
around this issue. Elementary schools, state and independent, were to receive the same 
financial assistance from the state in proportion to their enrolments. Universal manhood 
suffrage would be implemented based on the system of proportional representation. Labour 
unions were recognized. The nature of compromise for these agreements in the Pacification of 
1917 established the consociational character of Dutch politics. First, elite representatives put 
aside ideological differences to find pragmatic solutions. To the extent of rigging a national 
election, rank and file members were left out of the process entirely. Second, representatives 
from all four subgroups were involved in the settlement. Third, and most importantly, the 
principle of proportionality was legitimized and later institutionalized.  
Proportionality determined allocation of government resources to the blocs. All 
schools, independent and state, would receive government funds in proportion to the number 
of students enrolled. The same rule applied in determining levels of governmental assistance 
to hospitals and other welfare functions. Proportionality applied to other areas as well. 
Network time on the state-owned radio and television outlets was allocated to bloc 
organizations roughly in proportion to their memberships. These policies ‘enabled the bloc 
organizations to translate social cleavages into institutional boundaries and to achieve nearly 
exclusive control within their own spheres’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 196). Today, the state 
television and radio stations, national newspapers, major political parties and education retain 
vestiges of pillarization, but ideological exclusiveness has weakened, when it has not 
disappeared altogether. 
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To be sure, there were always factors encouraging inter-bloc cooperation. For one, the 
‘class composition of each bloc is virtually identical to the class composition of the 
population as a whole regardless of whether class is measured in terms of income or in terms 
of socioeconomic status’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 90). Thus, the intersection of religion and class 
created a cross-cutting cleavage. A shared sense of nationalism also meant ‘group solidarities 
may be strong while overarching solidarities are also strong’ (Lijphart, p. 82). Symbols such 
as the national airline (KLM), the House of Orange and large-scale land reclamation projects 
created the symbols of unified citizenship. However, the strongest national adhesive were the 
elites. 
Bloc elites navigated divisive issues in a minimally consensual context with a ‘results-
oriented attitude’, an ‘attitude that doctrinal disputes should not stand in the way of getting the 
work done’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 123-124). Differences need not be respected, but they must 
be tolerated. Shortly after the Second World War, the controversial Indonesian War for 
Independence led to an ‘agreement to disagree’, an implicit gag rule referred to as the ‘icebox 
policy’ (Lijphart, 1966). Even with a legislative majority, concessions were made to avoid 
upsetting a bloc. The ‘politics of accommodation’ gradually grew more institutionalized. 
Serious political issues were handled through ‘summit diplomacy’. For example, state aid to 
religious schools and extending the suffrage were not solved through open legislative debate 
and vote, but by conferences attended by the top leaders of all parties. In this way, sensitive 
issues were effectively depoliticized through secrecy as well as rendering policy agendas 
incomprehensible to the rank and file through ‘the use of complicated economic arguments 
and the juggling of economic facts and figures’. Legal and constitutional references were used 
to the same effect (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 129). In a plural stated riddled with powder keg issues, 
an ‘information gap’ might prove desirable, even as it tests our liberal democratic instincts. 
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‘Secrecy is an important rule’ because concessions could be made to a bloc without invoking 
the ire of other blocs (Lijphart, p. 131).    
The general population had little political interest because ‘the rules of secrecy, 
proportionality, and depoliticization keep much of the fire and excitement out of politics’ 
(Lijphart, 1968a, p. 137). Daalder (1966) described the ‘mixture of both deference and 
indifference which tended to characterize the attitude of most Dutchmen toward authority’ 
(1968a, p. 197). Much of policymaking occurred not in the legislature, but among technocrats 
in the non-elected Social and Economic Council. The SES provided an institutionalized forum 
for cross-cutting contacts where the leaders of all groups with a stake in the economic process 
met (Lijphart, p. 179). Here, the ever-present disintegrative tendencies inherent to the system 
could be monitored and checked. While elite communication tended toward the pragmatic, 
discourse between ‘the leaders and their followers tend to be couched in ideological terms’ 
(Lijphart, p. 140). The existence of small, fringe parties outside the four blocs provided 
outlets for dissatisfaction.  
Education was an important element in perpetuating the bloc pattern. Students were 
physically separated and taught different values. This transcended the teaching of religious 
beliefs, since the standards emphasized in elementary schools were those of the separate 
subculture of the bloc rather than those of an integrated national culture. National history 
taught in elementary schools was merely the country’s past interpreted from each bloc’s point 
of view rather than a truly national history that formed a commonly appreciated and unifying 
background. ‘From kindergarten on, children are separated according to the bloc to which 
they belong, unless they live in a community where their bloc is so weakly represented that 
they have no special school. Friendships naturally develop within each bloc rather than across 
different blocs’ (Lijphart, 1968a, pp. 53-54). 
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5.4 Analysis 
Consociationalism should not be compared to an ‘ideal’ democratic model, but 
tensions between rival subcultures may prove too explosive for other alternatives. ‘Peaceful 
coexistence’ becomes the objective, which ‘may necessitate some deviations from pure 
democracy’ (Lijphart, 1968a, p. 179). Seen in this way, self-containment and a degree of 
isolation are not always negative values. ‘[I]n a society characterized by a very limited 
political consensus, stability will be enhanced if transactions between ideologically 
incompatible groups can be kept to a minimum’ (Lijphart, pp. 185-186). The argument does 
not favour apartheid because segregation ‘means self-imposed social isolation, whereas 
apartheid implies the imposition of segregation by a dominant group upon a less favored 
group’ (Lijphart, p. 186). What the Dutch case does show is that, despite the charged 
historical overtones, certain times and places support a doctrine of ‘separate but equal’. 
Though we may favour an integrationist answer to the problem of social stability, 
consociationalism provides a historical alternative when groups adhere to conflicting dogmas 
or nurse historic grievances (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006). Consociational democracy ‘opens 
up the possibility of viable democracy even where social conditions appear unpromising. For 
those committed to the democratic creed, this is an optimistic and happy conclusion’ 
(Lijphart, 1968a, p. 195). Though consociational procedures and practices contradict majority 
rule, most democratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of 
business, but extraordinary majorities or several successive majorities for the most important 
decisions, such as constitutional amendments. Deeply divided contexts demand different 
measures because there are more decisions involving high stakes. Indeed, ‘majority rule does 
not suffice in times of grave crisis in even the most homogeneous and consensual of 
democracies’ (Lijphart, p. 214).  
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Consociationalism need not be an end, but rather a means for dealing with 
contemporaneous challenges while encouraging growth toward a more inclusive democratic 
political culture. In time, this could lead to less institutional safeguards, greater transparency 
and more majority decision-making. For example, the demise of consociational democracy in 
the nineteen sixties and early nineteen seventies indicates how the pillar system became a 
victim of its own success. This occurred as much of the population adopted ‘diffuse and 
overlapping identities’ (Maris, 2007), and the ‘cooperation of minority groups muted the 
political impact of cleavages’ (Lehmbruch, 1993).  
Critics attack Lijphart’s model based largely on his inductive methodology. Barry 
(1979) questions Lijphart’s examples of consociational democracy. In Switzerland, he argues 
cultural subgroups were not nearly as divided as Lijphart claims: ‘political parties cross-cut 
cleavages in society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus rather than highly 
structured conflict of goals’ (Barry, p. 501). Bakvis (1984) observes consociational theory 
found little outright support even among political scientists in Lijphart’s home country, the 
Netherlands. Van de Kaa (1980) and Van Schendelen (1984) assert the theory relies on 
cherry-picked examples from Dutch political culture. Both believe that in the post-War period 
the pillars were not as sharply defined as Lijphart supposes. While Lijphart (1968a) claims the 
Netherlands was a pillarized society from 1917 until 1967, Van Schendelen believes that de-
pillarization was already occurring in the 1950s.  
Not only does Lustick (1997) find fault with what he terms the empirical 
overextension of Dutch history, he also believes Lijphart’s methodology is shaky and his 
terms hollow. In short, Lijphart employs an ‘impressionist’ social science research approach 
with ‘expansive rhetorical opportunities to a research program with aspirations for near 
universal application’. Associated with this approach are ‘vague and elastic coding rules that 
permit extreme selectivity in the use of evidence’ (Lustick, p. 14). An additional criticism is 
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that, since introducing the theory in the nineteen sixties, Lijphart continually discovered new 
examples that fit the model but ignored inconvenient variables. Also, as the list of 
consociational countries increased, more factors favourable to consociationalism were found. 
Andeweg (2000) notes that social cleavages may not be pre-existing, and even if they are, 
domination by political elites perpetuates pillarization in the way of ‘social apartheid’ (p. 
519). ‘Social differences do not become divisive cleavages spontaneously; they are made 
salient by political entrepreneurs who use them to mobilize support’ (Andeweg, p. 528). The 
elites ‘are the same ones who created the problem in the first place’. Thus, the theory is ‘a 
mere tautology’ because ‘both the problem and the solution are part of the definition’ 
(Andeweg, p. 520). Lustick (1979) concludes consociational theory gained currency mainly 
because the alternative model of authoritarian (‘control’) regimes has little normative appeal.  
In later work, Lijphart (1985, 1999) explored the related idea of ‘consensus 
democracy’ or ‘non-majoritarian democracy’. Whereas majoritarian, or Westminster 
democracy, employs competitive decision making (a simple majority rules), consensus 
democracy involves institutionalized mechanisms based on a group rights formula. ‘Non-
majoritarian decision making entails the use of qualified majorities, and hence minority veto 
power, instead of regular majorities’ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 4). These democracies are said to 
score higher on social indicators, with lower inflation, superior environmental stewardship, 
lower prison populations and less use of capital punishment. But in his data analysis of 22 
OECD countries from 1971 to 1996, Armingeon (2002) challenges the claim of 
consociationalism as a ‘better, gentler and kinder’ democratic variant. Because of practices 
favouring closed decision-making and limits on popular influence, he questions the 
appropriateness of the democratic label. He does, however, believe the counter-majoritarian 
corporatist structures inherent to consociationalism have advantages in the integration of large 
minorities. In states so constituted, he finds higher rates of employment and less inflation. 
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5.5 Discussion 
In the Netherlands, the pillars gave way to the social transformations of the nineteen 
sixties. The comprehensiveness of the consociational system ceded to inclusiveness. Even if 
consociationalism is indeed a transitory step necessitated by social exigencies, the model’s 
pervasive separation may prove inappropriate to the needs of today’s immigrants. The 
challenge, then, becomes how to reconfigure consociationally based educational arrangements 
so as to preserve the integrity of vulnerable cultural groups while also satisfying liberal 
democratic criteria.  
The fact that state-funded Islamic schools can be established in the Netherlands, as 
well as some other countries, illustrates how limited forms of legal pluralism might integrate 
religious groups into the national life. The operation of these schools requires ongoing 
cooperation with the state. In the example of religiously-based political parties, participation 
in the competitive political process may have a transformative effect in ‘integrating huge 
masses of believers into the democratic polity, and even to liberalize and democratize the 
associated national churches’. By substituting reciprocal policies for enforced assimilation (or 
re-pillarization), ‘the chances will be minimized that minorities develop into isolated groups 
living from cradle to grave in separate institutions’ (Bader, 2003, p. 286). To further develop 
this position, I will next critically explore the development, structure and current issues 
confronting the state educational system in the Netherlands. The aim is to demonstrate how a 
consociational system developed for building ideological moats between adversaries evolved 
a commitment to egalitarian values and greater inclusiveness. 
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Chapter 6: The Dutch Educational Model   
 
6.1 Definitive Issues 
 General agreement exists in liberal democracies that the state should subsidize 
compulsory education because it is seen as both a public and primary good, a benefit to 
society as well as to the individual. However, sharp disagreements exist over whether the state 
should financially support schools for cultural and religious subgroups. Yet for over a century 
such support generated little discussion in the Netherlands because it was seen as a natural 
extension of state neutrality. Today, the major political parties remain committed to the 
constitutional principle of ‘freedom of education’ (vrijheid van onderwijs).  
In opposition to difference-blindness, the Dutch approach of relative neutrality 
operates in terms of difference-sensitivity. In this stance, the state remains ‘equidistant to both 
religious and secular worldviews and practices’ (Bader, 2007, p. 101). This policy addresses 
equality of opportunity through directly confronting educational inequalities. Only through 
sensitivity to actual differences can we hope that institutions and policies will, in the long 
term, become more neutral in relation to pluralism (Bader, 1999, p. 608). This chapter 
explores Dutch school system’s consociational and egalitarian character relative to liberal 
democratic values. First, the model will be described; second, its historical formation traced; 
third, current challenges relative to Islamic schooling explored.   
 
6.2 The Model 
A broad array of faith-based and secular schools with diverse pedagogical approaches 
represent the present-day reality of compulsory education in the Netherlands. The system 
combines centralized policy with decentralized school management. Nationwide school 
choice exists, and schools are permitted to maintain ideological criteria for admissions. 
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Despite the standardization imposed through the introduction of a core curriculum in 1993, 
schools enjoy a great degree of autonomy. Also, block grant funding affords schools fiscal 
flexibility. Due to the freedom to choose a school, an equitable funding mechanism and the 
traditional Dutch Calvinist aversion to flaunting wealth and status, a system of ‘explicitly elite 
schools’ has not developed (Dronkers, 1995). Because Dutch students rank among the highest 
in Europe in international comparisons, proponents of open educational markets have shown 
interest in the Netherlands (Auernheimer, 2006; Justesen, 2002).  
Almost all four-year-olds (99%) attend primary school (basisschool), which is 
compulsory at age five. Early childhood education (peuterschool) is offered free or at a 
minimal cost for students from age two to four. So as to address educational disadvantage at 
an early age, students from disadvantaged backgrounds receive extra pedagogical attention at 
this stage. After completing primary school at approximately age twelve, students usually 
choose between four types of secondary education: pre-university, general secondary 
education (two levels) and lower vocational education. Education is compulsory until the age 
of sixteen. If students have not secured a basic qualification, education continues up to the age 
of eighteen. Pre-university education (VWO, 6 years) prepares students to enter universities or 
colleges of higher professional education. Senior general secondary education (HAVO, 5 
years) is designed to prepare students for higher professional education. Junior secondary 
vocational education (VMBO) provides a four-year course of pre-vocational education. 
Schools usually accommodate these streams in the same building. It is not uncommon for a 
student to re-sit if her progress is not sufficient in a particular year (Eurydice, 2011). 
Decisions on which stream to admit students are made by a national test given during 
the final year of primary school. Schools also have boards composed of school directors and 
teachers whose recommendations factor into the decision. Students who cannot complete the 
level of junior secondary vocational education (VMBO) receive practical training 
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(praktijkonderwijs) to prepare them for entry into the labour market. There are also schools 
for special needs students (special voortgezet onderwijs). 
 
Fig. 1 
Primary Education (Primair Onderwijs) 
Primary education consists of primary school (basisschool) and 
special needs school for primary education (speciale school voor 
basisonderwijs) 
 
Age 5 to 12 
Secondary Education (Voortgezet Onderwijs) 
 Pre-university education, VWO (Voorbereidend 
wetenschappenlijk onderwijs) 
 Senior general secondary education, HAVO (Hoger algemeen 
voortgezet onderwijs) 
 Pre-vocational secondary education, VMBO (Voorbereidend 
middelbaar beroepsonderwijs) 
 Special secondary education (Special voortgezet onderwijs) 
 Practical training (Praktijkonderwijs) 
 
Age 12 to 18 
 
Age 12 to 17 
 
Age 12 to 16 
 
Age 12 to 18/20 
Age 12 to 18 
Eurydice. (2011). National System Overview on Educational Systems—The Netherlands. 
European Commission. eacea.ec.eu/education/Eurydice/documents/eurybase/national-
summary-sheets/047_NL_EN.pdf 
 
Students with a VMBO diploma can progress to applied jobs training, MBO 
(middelbaar beroepsonderwijs). If certain requirements are satisfied, they can also progress to 
higher education, as there can be lateral movement between streams. The system of higher 
education is binary. Typically, students with a HAVO diploma will attend higher professional 
education (HBO-hoger beroepsonderwijs). Those with a VWO usually chose to attend 
university (WO-wetenschappelijk onderwijs). Universities differ from institutions of higher 
professional education in that they are more research-oriented and do not specialize in one 
particular field. Teacher training traditionally occurs at institutions of higher professional 
education, but some members of the ruling coalition propose that VWO teachers should have 
university educations because their students go on to attend university (Schreuder, 2013). 
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Fig. 2 
Ages are approximate         
Workforce Bachelors, Masters Bachelors, Masters, 
Doctoral 
MBO 
Ages 12-16 
HBO 
Ages 17-20 
WO 
Ages 18-21 
VMBO* 
Ages 12-16 
HAVO 
Ages 12-17 
                    VWO 
                 Ages 12-18 
 
Elementary School (Basisschool), Ages 4-12 
 
 
Pre-School (Peuterschool), Ages 2-4 
 
* In place of VMBO, some students receive practical training (praktijkonderwijs) from ages 
12-16/18. 
 
             
6.3 The Consociational Evolution of Dutch Schools 
Calvinism was the predominant religion from the sixteenth century until the first half 
of the nineteenth century. After the French invasion (1795), the state separated from the 
Dutch Reformed Church, though Calvinists retained positions of power. In the eighteenth 
century, orthodox Calvinists entered a period of religious awakening, rejecting the liberal 
tenor of the times. The Christian Reformed Church was founded as a more conservative 
response to the Dutch Reformed Church. Separate schools were founded alongside 
congregations. In accordance with the liberal Constitution of 1848, state schools were 
monitored for religious neutrality. Private schools could be established, but without state 
financial support. 
Though the government was obliged to provide state education in 1815, it was not 
until 1917 that both state and independent education became a government responsibility. 
Religious schools were initially content to work without financial support, since this support 
would come with state intervention. However, after legislative requirements for schools 
appeared in the eighteen seventies, the stage was set for the ‘School War’ (Schoolstrijd). 
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Religious denominations demanded that their schools receive funding equivalent to state 
schools. Motivated by this demand, the four dominant pillars—the Protestants, Catholics, 
Liberals and Socialists— reached a logrolling arrangement. In true Dutch fashion, all groups 
secured concessions from the others. The Constitution of 1917 gave the Liberals leadership in 
the new government, the Socialist demand for universal male suffrage was granted and the 
Christians received parity in state funding for their religious schools. In 1920, Article 23 of 
the Constitution gave parents the right to choose state-funded independent or faith-based 
schools for their children (Sturm et al., 1998).  
Today, state-funded schools are mainly Roman Catholic, Protestant and independent. 
To a large degree, Christian schools have lost their religious salience. However, even as 
church attendance has waned, enrolment at religious schools has remained constant. The main 
reason parents cite for selecting these schools is the belief that they offer a better education 
(Driessen & Van der Slik, 2001). With respect to the number of primary schools in 2012, 
Protestant schools represent thirty-three percent of the total, Roman Catholic schools thirty 
percent and a broad array of independent schools thirty percent. The remaining seven percent 
mostly comprise schools of Islamic, Hindu, Jena, Montessori and Steiner philosophies. In the 
nineteen seventies and eighties, catchment areas were abolished and choice was expanded on 
a nation-wide basis (Dronkers et al., 2001). 
The Dutch method of ‘user-preference finance’ has been held as an international 
model for economically disadvantaged families to access high quality schools (Justesen, 
2002; Venegoni & Ferrero, 2004). There are five per-capita funding formulas sensitive to 
pupil SES. Children from reasonably affluent families count for 1 point, working-class Dutch 
children for 1.25, and ethnic minority children for 1.9. Consequently, this formula is very 
favourable to schools with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. In fact, children of poor 
foreign-born parents bring their school ninety percent more in financial support than Dutch-
86 
 
 
born children from reasonably affluent circumstances. The so-called ‘black schools’ receive 
almost twice as much financial support as would a school serving only affluent students. 
• 1.25 students receive 25 percent additional funding. These are students for 
whom one parent has attained a vocational level of education. 
• 1.4 students receive 40 percent additional funding. These are students in state 
care or members of ‘barge families’, that is, working and living on the inland 
waterways. 
• 1.7 students receive 70 percent additional funding. These are the children of 
migrants. 
• 1.9 students receive 90 percent additional funding. These are the children of 
poor immigrants whose father or mother has attained at best a lower vocational 
education. 
 
To prevent schools from poaching teachers from other schools, salaries cannot deviate from 
the national scale. As in most other systems, salaries are determined by educational level and 
experience.  
 
6.4 The Islamic Challenge  
The Dutch term for society, samenleven, literally means ‘living together’.  In the 
context of a small, densely populated country with a history of social segmentation, the word 
takes on special meaning. In the perennial battle against the sea, subgroups learned to set 
aside differences and work together. Massive tracts of land (polders) were reclaimed from the 
water. The term ‘polder model’ is used to describe the deliberative, collaborative and 
pragmatic nature of consensus decision-making in the Netherlands. Two grisly, high-profile 
murders early in the millennium sent shock waves through this political landscape.  
In 2002, Volkert van der Graaf gunned down the flamboyant right-wing politician 
Pym Fortuyn. Fortuyn, who gave his name to a political party, called Islam ‘a retrograde 
culture’ and proposed ending immigration from Islamic countries (Poorthuis & Wansink, 
2002). Van der Graaf claimed he killed Fortuyn to end his ‘exploiting Moslems as scapegoats’ 
and targeting ‘the weak parts of society to score points’ (Evans-Pritchard & Clements, 2003). 
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In 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, the Dutch-born son of Moroccan immigrants, murdered film 
director Theo van Gogh soon after the release of Submission, a provocative film about the 
treatment of women in Islamic societies. After the van Gogh murder, Islamic mosques and 
schools became targets for vandalism and arson. Former parliamentarian and van Gogh 
collaborator Ayaan Hirshi Ali went into hiding. In 2007, Ali published Infidel, an 
international bestselling autobiography. This book and her public pronouncements offended 
many Muslims and required her being assigned a protective police detail. More recently, the 
seemingly ubiquitous right-wing parliamentarian Geert Wilder’s strident criticisms of 
multicultural policy, and Islam in particular (he proposed levying a tax on the wearing of 
headscarves), have also necessitated police protection. In 2009, he was denied entry into 
Britain to screen his anti-Islam film, Fitna (2008).  
The way a nation approaches questions of immigration and identity is historically 
conditioned. During the Second World War, 102,000 of 140,000 Dutch Jews were murdered. 
This equates to seventy-five percent, the highest of any Western European country outside 
Germany (Croes, 2006). Even now, Dutch complicity in the Holocaust is rarely discussed. 
The Dutch are sensitive regarding cultural difference. The journalist Paul Scheffer (2000) 
broke an unwritten taboo and turned multiculturalism into a mainstream political issue with 
his essay, ‘The Multicultural Drama’ (Het multiculturele drama). The piece, published in the 
respected national newspaper NRC-Handelsblad, charged Dutch politicians with wilfully 
failing to recognize that government immigration and integration policies were partly 
responsible for creating a permanent ‘black’ underclass. 
The roots of these current controversies began as the pillar system was declining in the 
late nineteen sixties. The Netherlands experienced a massive influx of foreign workers. In 
1971, a mere 1.6 percent of the population belonged to an ethnic minority group; in 2011, 
those numbers increased to 22.2 percent (CBS, 2011). High fertility rates and family 
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reunification policies combined with smaller family sizes on the part of the native population 
have meant a steady, visible growth in the population of Moroccan and Turkish origin. In 
Amsterdam over thirty percent of the population is foreign-born (CBS, 2011). Today, 17.5 
percent of the inhabitants of the Netherlands were born abroad or have at least one parent who 
was born abroad (Vasileva, 2011).  
Some commentators look back toward pillarization as a model for integrating ethno-
cultural subgroups (Lijphart, 1995); others worry pillarization equates to ghettoization 
(Spiecker, & Steutel, 2001). Particularly in urban areas, immigrants cluster in tight-knit 
communities removed from the mainstream culture. With regard to the second and third 
generation of the immigrant wave, there are worries that cultural alienation and economic 
frustrations foment attraction to a more fundamentalist Islam than that held by their fathers 
and grandfathers (Scheffer, 2000). The current discussion revolves around how a pluriform 
nation that has historically privileged political equality and toleration can deal with robust 
expressions of cultural determinism. Reports that as many as eighty percent of Moroccan and 
Turkish marriages in the Netherlands are arranged stands in opposition to the norms and 
values of the dominant culture (Koning & Bartels, 2005). Moreover, many imported brides do 
not speak Dutch and have no desire to learn it (Kruijt, 2004). In response, the government 
created a mandatory integration process (inburgering), whereby immigrants take language 
and civics classes. Since 2006, prospective permanent residents must take these courses and, 
in some cases, pass a civics test at the Dutch diplomatic mission in their homeland before 
arriving in the Netherlands.    
According to the Ministry of Education, intercultural education, a mandatory element 
in Dutch schools since the nineteen eighties, promotes mutual understanding between 
different cultural groups. For Leeman and Ledoux (2003), these programs have been largely 
ineffectual because of little public demand, vagueness on how to teach the curriculum and, 
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most importantly, reluctance on the part of teachers to acknowledge the relevance of ‘the 
intercultural’. ‘Culturalism’ reigns in Dutch classrooms because predominantly white teachers 
tend to perceive ‘people as members of an ethnic-cultural group and associate them with the 
cultural characteristics of that group’ (Leeman & Ledoux, p. 388). 
Common ground could formerly be found across the traditional Dutch pillars through 
identification with Christianity, similar historical narratives and a shared language, ‘which 
implies common ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Metaphorically speaking, one could say 
that the pillars, however different their group cultures, shared the same roof’ (Spiecker & 
Steutel, 2001, p. 296). In the historical example, Catholics, concentrated in the provincial 
south and the urban worker class, were able to improve their SES through forming a powerful 
bloc, galvanizing around identity in the quest for emancipation. Characteristics of recent 
immigrant groups question the relevance of the historical analogy. New immigrants often 
come from the most undeveloped regions of their home countries and from tribal groups with 
the lowest status and poor schooling. 
They speak their own native language, and, perhaps more importantly, they brought 
with them Islamic conceptions of government, law, marriage, and family life. Using 
the same metaphor again, one could say that the newcomers, unlike the pillarized 
communities that preceded them, do not and cannot share the same roof’ (Spiecker & 
Steutel, p. 296).  
 
Lijphart’s (1995) answer of re-pillarization as a way to integrate new minorities may prove 
unrealistic for today’s challenges. 
The liberal rights package can be explained in Rawls’ (1971) first principle of justice, 
the principle of greatest equal liberty. Citizens are free and equal because of basic liberties 
such as freedom of conscience and religion. Further there are political rights, including the 
right to vote and run for office, as well as legal rights such as due process and equal treatment. 
Without these safeguards, liberal democracy fails. In line with Rawls’ (1993) warning of a 
modus vivendi arrangement between parties with differing comprehensive philosophies, there 
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are concerns that an Islamic pillar would merely bide its time and pretend to abide by liberal 
democratic principles until it possessed the strength to install a government conforming to 
religious tenets (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 302).  
Pillars are not fertile breeding grounds for the virtues implied in critical thinking. […] 
an important function of the classical pillars has been the integration and emancipation 
of lower social classes. Indeed proponents of re-pillarization always highlight this 
particular function. Another well-documented function of pillars, however, is the 
preservation of their moral and/or religious foundation and the preservation of any 
ideological aberration of their members (Spiecker & Steutel, p. 303).      
 
Integration would prove difficult if, in fact, ‘the face of Islam in the Netherlands is 
predominantly illiberal, if not plainly fundamentalist’ (Spiecker & Steutel, p. 302).   
Needless to say, the Islamic community in the Netherlands is not ideologically 
monolithic. Immigrants come from a host of regions and backgrounds, and, reflective of the 
many schisms and doctrinal debates, communities practice their faith differently (Saadallah, 
2004). To accommodate these splits, many governing bodies exist. The three major Muslim 
communities in the Netherlands are Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. There are also 
sizeable Indonesian (Moluccans) and Pakistani populations. Yet, it is the Turkish and 
Moroccan communities which attract the most attention from politicians and the media. Since 
the nineteen sixties, labour migrants from these two countries left poor rural areas with high 
levels of illiteracy. Compared to those who fled poverty on the Anatolian Plain, the Moroccan 
immigrants were even more disadvantaged. Many of them spoke Berber, a language without a 
written tradition.  
The guest workers organized themselves around prayer halls and mosques. Today 
there are approximately one million Muslims in the Netherlands (CBS, 2011). They comprise 
almost seven percent of the population, and their members form a highly visible underclass 
clustered in subsidized housing on the outskirts of metropolitan centres. In the vernacular, 
these are ‘satellite cities’. The proliferation of satellite dishes on apartment blocks allow 
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inhabitants a degree of insularity due to twenty-four hour connection to the homeland. ‘A 
well-documented source of tension in these immigrant families is that the parents do not find 
the Netherlands a fertile soil for inculcating collectivistic values into their children’ (Spiecker 
& Steutel, 2001, p. 296).  Poverty, limited prospects for advancement and conflicted identities 
have led some in the younger generation to embrace ‘new currents in Islam claiming to 
represent pure forms of belief of an outspoken illiberal character’ (Maris, 2007, p. 24).  
Islamic schools cater to populations of either Moroccan or Turkish origins (Driessen 
& Merry, 2006). Out of approximately seven-thousand primary schools and seven-hundred 
secondary schools, there are only forty-six state-funded Islamic primary schools and no 
secondary schools. Secondary Islamic schools in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were closed 
within the last two years because of poor academic results, financial irregularities and a 
cheating scandal (Kasteleijn, 2013). Because thirty to forty percent of Turkish or Moroccan 
parents would select an Islamic school for their children were these schools available, demand 
far exceeds supply (Van Kessel, 2004). However, the cumbersome administrative process to 
create new schools poses a significant hurdle to the Islamic community (Driessen & Bezemer, 
1999; Kouwenhoven, 2013). In 2004, the Ministry of Education issued a series of policy 
directives and accountability controls. Schools must provide clear guidance on how they 
support social integration, and all school board members must hold Dutch citizenship. The 
greatest impediment is the requirement that no more than eighty percent of students can be 
defined as belonging to a lower socioeconomic class. It is very difficult for Islamic schools to 
acquire the necessary twenty percent of students not from disadvantaged backgrounds (Merry 
& Driessen, 2005). There are concerns that the level of self-segregation and ‘white flight’ 
would increase were it not for bureaucratic impediments to the creation of more Islamic 
schools (Driessen & Merry, 2006). 
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Approximately seventy percent of teachers in state-funded Muslim schools are non-
Muslims. National teacher licensure requirements apply to all subject areas except Minority 
Language and Culture and Religious Instruction. This group of teachers does not always 
speak Dutch. Because few school principals speak Arabic or Turkish, they had little 
knowledge of what these teachers are actually teaching (Driessen & Bezemer, 1999). Shortly 
after the 9-11 attacks, the Inspectorate of Education published a report highlighting perceived 
risks for radicalism in these curricular areas (Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 2002). In that same 
year, the National Security Service published a report on foreign influence in Islamic 
education. Twenty percent of schools were said to have received financial contributions from 
Al-Waqf al-Islami, an orthodox group critical of other religious groups, or had school board 
members connected to radical Islamic organizations. There were also reports of religious and 
language teachers opposed to the integration of Muslims in Dutch society (Binnenlandse 
Veiligheidsdienst, 2002). 
About half of the Turkish and Moroccan students attend private Qur’an classes after 
school. What is taught in these mosque-schools, where children might dedicate six to ten 
hours per week, has also come under state scrutiny (Maris, 2007). There have long been 
concerns that fundamentalist elements might co-opt these schools (Kabdan, 1992). Some 
imams openly preach against the integration of Muslims into Dutch society (Driessen & 
Merry, 2006). Because of fears of fundamentalism and threats to social cohesion, public 
opinion is strongly against the formation of more Islamic schools (Driessen, 2006). In short, 
the multicultural project has come under intense scrutiny. In many ways, current Dutch 
anxieties were anticipated by French politicians over a decade ago. 
Since the revolution of 1789, French national identity revolves around the ideals of 
Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité. All citizens, including immigrants, are expected to assume 
these values. ‘Correspondingly, the state is not allowed to take into account any citizen’s 
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descent, religion, or ethnicity. Indeed, even the very notion of multi-ethnicity is seen as a 
threat to the ideological cement of the nation’ (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 293). Challenged 
by group assertions for greater rights and recognition, the French government commissioned 
the Stasi Commission in 2003 to report on questions raised by multiculturalism. The 
Commission explicitly rejected the Dutch idea of difference-sensitive multiculturalism in 
reaffirming the ‘integration as assimilation’ model of laïcité. There are three principles 
operant in this conception: freedom of thought and conscience, legal equality and state 
neutrality. Strict separation of church and state is seen as the best path toward social cohesion. 
This requires secularization of the public sphere. Further, the Commission’s report implies the 
incompatibility of some forms of Islam with the norms and values of Western culture. In 
terms of educational policy, this manifests itself in banning religious headscarves, which the 
report construes as a symbol of women’s subjugation, from state schools. The French model 
thereby excludes the role of religio-cultural groups in the state educational enterprise. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
During the nineteen sixties and seventies, Dutch political elites believed immigrant 
groups would integrate into an emerging multi-ethnic society animated by commonly-held 
liberal values. Today’s realities put the end goals of this project into question. Four decades 
ago, the dismantling of the salient features of the pillar system occurred alongside a Western 
movement toward greater individualism and demands for equal rights by women and cultural 
minorities. However, with the injection of new variants of collectivism into a social fabric 
strained by global market pressures, de facto re-pillarization on the part of immigrant 
communities creates fresh challenges for state schooling around problems of identity, justice 
and fairness. The applicability of the old answer of consociationalism to new problems comes 
with a host of ambiguities. 
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The struggle for equal recognition may be pursued through two avenues. First, there is 
the demand characteristic of the civil rights movement in the United States for full integration. 
The second demand involves legal pluralism, which carries the potential for ‘voluntary 
apartheid’. Self-determination means pursuing schooling sensitive to one’s cultural heritage, 
both as a means of reinforcing one’s identity and preserving group solidarity. In this respect, 
religious groups pose a challenge to the liberal democratic state if ‘their religious identity is 
something which they believe should permeate the whole of life’ (Halstead, 1995, p. 264). On 
the flip side, when schools animated by religious principles are not supported by the state, 
cultural collectives are not free to raise their children in accordance with their principles. For 
the liberal state to be sensitive to these concerns, requires a careful calibration of cultural 
demands with adherence to liberal democratic values. The next chapter integrates these issues 
into a conceptual framework defining cultural identity schools as a function of the equal right 
to citizenship. 
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Chapter 7: A Conceptual Framework for Cultural Identity Schools 
 
7.1 Definitive Issues  
 Earlier in the study, the neoliberal ascension was connected to the Modernist-
Enlightenment strategy of difference-blindness. That is to say, market competition, test-based 
instruction or calls for national allegiance define the permissible spectrum of human 
difference. Under a meritocratic veneer, this ideological convergence was posited as 
reinforcing educational processes hospitable to social reproduction. If cultural membership is 
indeed a human right, an imperative exists to protect this right. The claim is that cultural 
identity schools protect minority groups from majoritarian-imposed policies; and that 
culturally based learning improves student engagement and leads to better outcomes. On a 
broader level, the proposition was examined that decentralization and regulated school 
autonomy support innovation and create favourable conditions for citizen participation in the 
life of the school and the community. In the progressive tradition, schools are agents for 
democracy. This chapter presents a conceptual framework outlining how cultural identity 
schools are different from ‘government’ schools and how they theoretically deliver on the 
promise of the equal right to citizenship in a deliberative democracy.   
 
7.2 ‘Government’ versus Cultural Identity Schools 
The conceptual link between problems of identity and inequality are clarified in the 
increasing use of school metrics that stratify along predictable class lines in assigning ‘merit-
based’ rewards. Foucault (1980) conceptualized power as a complex and unequal arrangement 
of networks across human activity with the state ‘superstructural in relation’ (p. 122). There is 
an ontological link between discourse and the exercise of power in modern society since 
‘power is properly speaking the way in which relations and forms are deployed and given 
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concrete expression’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 86).  ‘Discourse based on public right’ articulates the 
relationship between citizens to the state through the instrumentation of ‘a certain economy of 
discourses of truth’ (Foucault, p. 93). At an elemental level, state schools maintain orthodoxy 
through ‘technologies of power’ which regulate discourse ‘in its distribution, in what it 
permits and what it prevents, it follows the lines laid down by social differences, conflicts and 
struggles’ (Foucault, 1979, p. 46). Cultural identity schools on the other hand reference a 
framework ‘which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76). What this means is 
that parents select the kind of sub-community they wish for their children. Thus, they are 
relieved of ‘the conceptually dishonest task of developing subcultural continuity and building 
loyalty to some often vaguely enunciated national centre’ (Holmes, 1992, p. vi). They are 
positioned as equal citizens. 
Government schools cling to a value-neutral ‘low doctrine’ curriculum. To avoid 
conflict, school authorities withdraw from moral areas where there is no consensus. As a 
result, these schools are characterized by curricula and pedagogical practices calculated to 
incur the least amount of offense. ‘It is very difficult for the genuinely heterogeneous school 
to go much beyond tolerance, non-violence and consideration for others’ (Holmes, 1992, p. 
65). ‘High doctrine’ schools on the other hand are more than compulsory communities: They 
speak to the ‘substance’ of diverse groups. What is learned in school is mirrored on the 
familial and communal level. Consequently, the shared experience and consistent animating 
principles of cultural identity schools promise higher levels of student engagement. Moreover, 
removal of dominant culture control helps ameliorate the problem of oppositional stances 
toward state authority; namely, how the position of subcultures in social production processes 
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predict the nature of students’ experiences (Muga, 1984; Ogbu & Simons, 1998; Ogbu & 
Davis, 2003). 
Internalization of class has complex explanations, which cannot be pursued here, but a 
tendency at state-sponsored reductionism reinforces the phenomenon. For example, when 
particular groups pose little threat to the privileges and immunities of social elites, cultural 
markers are apt to manifest at government schools as superficial concessions. Ethnic food 
days or world music celebrations come to mind. School leaders or curriculum developers 
rarely call for critical examinations of nation, culture or class in terms of asymmetric power 
relations or histories of oppression. These tendencies exert a homogenizing effect on 
pluralism, as they diminish the importance of minority experiences and legitimize the 
historical role and present status of social elites. Students outside the middle and upper classes 
are disempowered by a body of ‘institutional’ cultural capital ‘completely alien to [their] 
existential experience’ (Freire, 1970/2007, p. 69). ‘Our traditional curriculum, disconnected 
from life, centred on words emptied of the reality they are meant to represent, lacking in 
concrete activity could never develop a critical consciousness’ (Freire, 1974/2005, p. 33).  
In opposition to government schools (Fig. 3), cultural identity schools (Fig. 4) 
explicitly preserve cultural identity. Rather than an anodyne ‘low doctrine’ curriculum, 
cultural identity schools create the conditions favourable to a ‘high doctrine’ learning 
environment, one enriched by deeply held values and traditions. Similar to the role of 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s) during the long civil rights struggle in 
the United States, these schools deliver a platform for empowering their learners in a 
supportive environment—what might be called a secure cultural context—removed from 
majoritarian prejudices or expectations. One explanation for the continued relevance of 
HBCUs is that they offer a sanctuary, albeit temporary, from racial disadvantage. The 
principles of equality and respect animating these institutions provide a safe space where 
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future leaders receive the training and confidence to navigate the ambiguities and 
contradictions of the larger society’s supposed meritocracy (Boyd, 2007; Kim & Conrad, 
2006).  
 
Fig. 3 
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Fig. 4 
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There are many examples of how the principles animating cultural identity schools 
add to the educational landscape and, over time, attract a heterogeneous enrolment. In 
Ontario, French language schools originated to serve the linguistic and cultural needs of the 
minority Francophone population. However, as second language acquisition developed a 
cachet among parents, a surge in Anglophone attendance changed the character of these 
schools. Today, these are the fastest growing schools in the province (Makropoulos, 2010). 
Elsewhere, schools intended for specific faith groups witnessed similar transformations when 
their enrolments became more inclusiveness. For example, many universities in the Anglo-
Saxon world began with the mission of training clergy. Because of their low tuition and 
reputation for fostering academic achievement, urban Catholic schools have long been a 
popular choice for African Americans otherwise consigned to financially strapped and poorly 
performing state schools (Kozol, 1991, 2005). In fact, only twenty percent of the Black 
enrolment at these institutions self-identify as Catholic (Cattaro & Cooper, 2007). In the 
Netherlands, Roman Catholic schools are also a popular option for non-Catholics due to the 
perception that they maintain higher levels of discipline and academic standards than their 
secular counterparts (Driessen & Van der Slik, 2001). In Washington, D.C., President Barrack 
Obama's daughters attend the Quaker Sidwell Friends School. Of the four presidents whose 
children attended the school, only Richard Nixon belonged to the Society of Friends.  
 
7.3 Discussion 
 Nations officially charge their schools with encouraging the intellectual potential of 
students while developing them for their future roles as citizens and workers. Though state 
education recalls liberalism’s fundamental tenet of equality before the law, implicit in the 
compulsory education project is the inculcation of a civic ideology.  For this reason, schooling 
navigates a built-in dialectic: Plural democracies must reconcile the imperative of social 
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cohesion on the one hand with group demands for cultural development and rights on the 
other. This is tricky business in the liberal democratic state. For instance, state funding of 
cultural identity schools might be construed as antithetical to the individualism arising from 
Western political culture (Williams, 1998). Further, in the face of all-embracing group 
identities incapable of leaving religious obligations at the schoolhouse door, compromise in 
terms of curricular content or pedagogical approaches on the part of some orthodox groups 
represents a difficult proposition (Siddiqui, 1997).   
 In this chapter, I identified the framework for cultural identity schools as a function of 
the equal right to citizenship, what Taylor (1999) calls ‘equal authenticity’. The success of 
liberal democracy depends upon citizens who understand the issues of the day and participate 
in the political process. A pluriform system of schooling, at least conceptually, adds to the 
variety of learning methods engaging critical thought and problem solving. The model sets the 
stage for processes of negotiation and bargaining between political equals. Thus, the 
associative structures at the heart of participatory democracy are strengthened. For the state 
actor, the challenge resides in creating an environment where critical thinking and self-
reflection coexist with the value of preserving cultural identity.  
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Chapter 8: Going Forward by Looking Back 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter integrates analysis developed in the earlier discussion sections. First, 
concepts and issues relevant to the research question are synthesized. Second, inferences 
related to the research objectives are outlined. Third, theoretical and practical implications 
and limits are described. Fourth, further avenues for research are suggested. Fifth, concluding 
observations are made.  
This study set out to critically examine the congruence of liberal democratic values 
with a national educational system affording the option of state-funded cultural identity 
schools. The question was framed within the challenges of today’s global conjuncture, where 
post-Cold War optimism has been replaced by strident assertions of religio-cultural identity. 
In the industrialized West, the response to increasing pluralism has been a hardening of 
attitudes and official policies toward multiculturalism and immigration (Chapter 1). The 
adequacy of the Modernist-Enlightenment difference-blind stance was evaluated in terms how 
the convergence of autonomy-based strands of liberalism and late capitalism produces 
conditions favourable to dominant cultural hegemony in educational practice and policy 
(Chapters 2 and 3). Difference-blindness was compared with difference-sensitivity (Chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6). Through exploring theoretical possibilities and historical examples, consensus-
building models were inductively tested to determine pitfalls and potentialities for how 
educational pluralism might not only conform to liberal principles, but also energize schools 
as agents for sustaining and deepening deliberative democracy (Chapters 4 and 5). Processes 
of negotiation and bargaining inherent to these arrangements were investigated as avenues for 
increasing intercultural tolerance and contemporizing the scope of citizenship (Chapter 4). To 
define challenges and opportunities, the study looked toward the historical example of the 
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Netherlands (Chapter 6). Understanding of issues was then operationalized into a conceptual 
framework for cultural identity schools (Chapter 7).  
 
8.2 Addressing the Question   
Three research objectives were investigated. In this section, claims and inferences 
relative to these objectives are systemized. 
 
8.2.1 To explore to what extent, if any, cultural identity schools act as counter- 
          hegemony to the market model in education. 
This objective references an imperative to defend both cultural identity and liberal 
democracy from Third Way policies. Two lines of inquiry were pursued: first, the overarching 
effect of market competition on education in the liberal democratic state (e.g., Apple, 2004; 
Bernal, 2005); second, curricular narrowing through emphasis on test-based instruction (e.g., 
Au, 2007; Darling Hammond, 2004). Both tendencies privilege dominant and private interests 
over inclusive modes of decision-making. Both tendencies de-legitimize the knowledge and 
experiences of minority cultures. 
The first line of inquiry posits that the heuristic coupling of neoliberalism with liberal 
core precepts around fairness, equality and freedom informs a narrative which rationalizes 
dwindling government commitments to vulnerable populations (Wolin, 2008). Because of 
differentiated starting positions, equal rights and opportunities do not translate into equal 
outcomes in educational processes (Bourdieu, 1973, 1976; Friere, 1970/2007). There are 
suggestions that school choice might exacerbate this problem (Bernal, 2005). The second line 
of inquiry posits that the regulatory effects of positivist and managerial approaches creates 
frontiers of exclusion in schooling. High-stakes testing curtails minority influence on 
educational content and processes. In effect, differentiation between the high status 
knowledge of the dominant class and the low status knowledge of minorities and other 
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marginalized groups becomes formally codified (Bourdieu, 1973; Apple, 1993). On a broader 
level, the near-unassailability of global market competition diminishes regional economies 
and cultures. Cultural pluralism was seen as counter-hegemony to global market forces 
(Chan-Tibergien, 2006). Placed in the current ideological climate, cultural identity schools 
were presented as countervail to the centripetal and homogenizing tendencies of 
marketization. At bottom, the pluriform platform of cultural identity schools was said to 
democratize teaching and learning. 
 
8.2.2 To explore whether cultural identity schools foster democratic 
         dialogue and the associative networks underpinning civil society 
         and participatory democracy.    
Cultural identity schools were conceived as a means of aligning citizens to their 
communities, so as to provide diverse foci for democratic participation and avenues toward 
greater political efficacy. Decentralization of policymaking and a resultant increase in local 
involvement finds support in civil society theory (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1989; Putnam, 
2000). The developed conceptual framework safeguards religio-cultural identity and energizes 
the liberal democratic state at the local level. Legal pluralism institutionalizes continuous 
dialogue between the state and constituent communitities. In return for state funding, 
communities pledge support for commonly agreed-upon principles of human rights, including 
the right of members to exit the community. The prospect of alternative explanations for the 
right and good foster educational creativity and innovation. Intercultural discourse 
reconceptualizes the philosophical foundations of the nation state around a fluid and dynamic 
definition of citizenship (Kubow et al., 2000). The nature of state schooling in the Netherlands 
displays how a sectarian system can aspire toward greater inclusiveness. 
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8.2.3 To explore whether cultural identity schools are a natural consequence for  
satisfying the liberal requirement to the equal right of citizenship.  
 The term equal right to citizenship references the principle of political and legal 
equality. The study proposed that the associational freedoms inherent to the political 
liberalism require protection of group rights. Modernist-Enlightenment strategies of 
privatizing religious and philosophical difference were portrayed as placing minority religio-
cultural groups at a disadvantage relative to the dominant culture (Modood, 2005; Joppke, 
2007a). In particular, the removal of religious rationale from public debate and politics was 
found ‘morally arbitrary, unfair, and practically counterproductive’ (Bader 2003, p. 265). 
Indeed, as exemplified by the issue of headscarves, states are inconsistent in how they deal 
with religious difference in schools. In short, difference-blind liberalism creates formidable 
obstacle for minority groups in their quest to be treated with respect or ‘equal authenticity’ 
(Taylor 1994). For example, Rawls’ (1971, 1987, 1993) principle of public reason as the 
framework for political discussion ignores the extent to which the sensibilities of the 
dominant culture have grafted onto political liberalism. That is to say, the political and 
associational cannot be separately as neatly as he suggests.  
 For religio-cultural minorities, cutural identity schools point toward higher levels of 
student engagement. Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s) provide an 
empirical example of empowering learners in an environment where the effects of 
discrimination are mediated. Students leave these institutions with the strength to succeed in 
the larger society, where their experiences contribute to a richer marketplace of ideas (Boyd, 
2007). These schools embody a secure cultural context and reference a framework students 
can endorse and justify, that is, a ‘high doctrine’ learning environment enriched by deeply 
held values and beliefs. It should be recalled that the Dutch educational model originated from 
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a civil rights struggle. Subgroups demanded equal respect and proportionate state funding for 
their schools and other social service agencies (Lijphart, 1968a).  
 
8.3 Implications and Limitations for the Study 
The study has theoretical implications for understanding the nature of the 
compatibility of cultural identity schools with liberal democratic values. Also, there are 
practical implications for policymakers in formulating and justifying strategies to satisfy 
group demands for such schools. Especially regarding non-Western immigration, the model 
also has limits and ambiguities. 
 
8.3.1 Theoretical Implications and Limitations  
The primary argument for cultural identity schools rests on the premise that 
associational freedoms constitute a human right. Political liberalism’s commitment to 
individual rights and its susceptibility to capture by dominant socioeconomic interests creates 
conditions inimical to this right. As a moral imperative, the polyethnic state is responsible for 
accomodating reasonable group demands. The reasons are two-fold. First, there is the 
obligation to address lingering effects of colonial exploitation and dislocation on former 
subject people. Second, because difference-blindness privileges dominant socioeconomic 
structures, the stance runs counter to liberal democratic values insofar as associational 
freedoms and the egalitarian dimensions of equality of opportunity are concerned. Proponents 
of strict neutrality ignore how minority status all too often becomes a proxy for 
socioeconomic disadvantage and exclusion from decision-making on what matters most—the 
education of one’s children. The response of difference-sensitivity requires that group 
demands be heard and respected. The formation and maintenance of cultural identity schools 
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presuppose an institutionalized mechanism for speaking across religio-cultural demarcations 
as equals, engaging in what Walzer (1990) calls ‘real talk’.  
Deliberative democracy requires that all stakeholders be heard. Though disagreeing on 
foundational principles, Rawls (1993) and MacIntyre (1988) both support public forum where 
traditions can argue in ways rivals can understand. Both stances suggest the possibility of 
moving outside the narrow circle of group affiliation toward a ‘second language’ of greater 
openness with new perceptions and beliefs. However, the rational basis underlying Rawls’ 
idea of the common good, the reference for all political dialogue, underrates the state actor’s 
role in defining and regulating permissible discourse. Also, the moral role of schools in a 
Rawlsian system would be ‘constrained to a strictly defined public domain isolated from any 
non-public moral values’ (Crittenden, 1994). The goal of consensus means a learning process 
‘based on actual agreement rather than criteria of truth and rationality hardly deserves the 
name education’ (Crittenden, p. 314). Public reason, strictly defined, allows scant space for 
moral reflection.  
The logic of Taylor’s (1999) idea of an ‘unforced consensus’ around human rights 
justifies the creation and maintenance of cultural identity schools around a shared reference to 
human rights. Citizens forge consensus despite ideological differences because, as in 
MacIntyre’s (1988) formulation, they find justification from within their own cultural 
understandings. Sometimes there will be ‘alternative, mutually incompatible justifications’ 
(Taylor, pp. 124-125). Even the most minimalist interpretations of fundamental freedoms or 
human rights condemn some culturally based practices (e.g., sati, genital mutilation or 
stoning). 
The commitment to deliberative democracy may imply a nod toward the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights over Western constitutionalism narrowly defined. But some 
group demands for separate schooling cannot be accommodated, even when the orbit of rights 
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is extended. Especially in regard to gender, adherence to ‘religious private, personal law’ 
presents challenges to the framework (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 15). For hard cases, the reciprocal 
arrangement to respect fundamental rights and freedoms in exchange for financial support to 
their schools may prove unrealistic. ‘Even-handedness’ requires that group demands be heard 
and respected (Carens, 2000). ‘Priority for democracy’ means some demands cannot be 
fulfilled (Bader, 2003).The goal of semi-autonomous schooling, however, provides a strong 
incentive for groups to take a hard look at themselves and determine how they might soften 
demands and over time modify stances.  
The thesis provides empirical support for the proposition that legal pluralism provides 
an avenue to integration and increased toleration. In the Netherlands, increasing secularization 
erased the potency of cultural markers and led to the decline of pillarization by at least the 
ninteen sixties (Lijphart, 1968a, 1969, 1985). However, citizens ‘shared the same roof’ of a 
common language and a Christian tradition (Spiecker & Steutel, 2001, p. 296). Further, the 
fissures between the four social segments may not have been as large as consociational theory 
asserts (Barry, 1979; van de Kaa, 1980; van Schendelen, 1984). The cultural and religious 
differences of the immigrants from Islamic countries are more profound, so the challenges to 
cultural identity schools as engines for democratic citizenship and civic integration are 
greater.  
The question of what forms of Islam (or any other faith group) are incommensurate 
with the liberal democratic version of group rights defined in this study remains an open 
question. The recent closures of the only two Islamic secondary schools in the Netherlands 
provide an unfavourable indicator (Kasteleijn, 2013). Taken as a whole, the example of ‘black 
schools’ in the Netherlands suggests that, even when funding mechanisms sensitive to 
disadvantage are operative, separate schooling for some groups hinders inclusiveness and 
their positive interaction with other cultures (Crul & Pasztor, 2007). ‘If the government defers 
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to the wishes of the religious group, a vulnerable group of individuals will lose basic rights; if 
the government commits itself to respecting equal human rights of all individuals, it will stand 
accused of indifference to the liberty of conscience’ (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 187). In the 
consociational spirit of dialogue (Lijphart, 1968a), the emergence of a younger generation of 
Islamic leaders willing to work closely with the state provides some grounds for optimism. 
Nonetheless, the applicability of consociationalism might be most germane to nations where 
consitutent groups are on a relatively equal footing or in plural emerging democracies with 
recent histories of sectarian violence. Again, it should be cautioned that generalizations are 
difficult owing to the internal diversity of minority cultures.  
Cultural identity schools theoretically provide a basis for a educational pluralism 
which tests different educational approaches and stymies the introduction of fads aligned to 
questionable metrics. An equitable school funding mechanism reflects liberal egalitarianism’s 
commitment to authentic equality and merits attention in other industrialized states. Genuine 
commitment to equality of opportunity runs counter to policies treating education as a 
commodity whose price is determined by local taxpayers’ ability to pay for it. The 
requirement for critical reflection and intercultural dialogue spelled out in the conceptual 
framework supports the goal toward multidimensional citizenship (Kubow et al., 2000). 
Accessing the understanding of groups outside the Western tradition may draw from untapped 
cultural reservoirs to address the existential challenges of the twenty-first century.  
 
8.3.2 Practical Implications and Limitations  
 Group demands for cultural identity schools should be taken seriously. The study 
demonstrated that satisfying these demands can be a logical consequence of liberal 
democracy. Democracy is ennobled through extending the full rights of citizenship to all. 
Rather than demand a consensus-based educational approach governing the content of all 
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schools, the model provides flexibility and innovation at the local level with broad oversight 
at the national level. Moreover, the regulatory framework controls illiberal tendencies as it 
institutionalizes dialogue and negotiation. The model satisfies core liberal precepts of justice 
and fairness in its stance of situating groups on equal terms. Also, the model’s progressive 
funding mechanism recognizes social disadvantage. However, there are cautions that need to 
be taken seriously. 
First, the appropriateness of the historical example of the Netherlands. Beyond 
criticisms of consociational theory’s empirical over-reach (Andeweg, 2000), the example may 
have limited applicability to mature democracies. In the Dutch case, leaders from the various 
social segments secretly reconciled differences through summit diplomacy (Lijphart, 1968a). 
Though the means were opaque, they were peacefully bridging sectarian divides. However, 
the anti-democratic remedy of procedurally excluding citizen participation may perpetuate 
social segmentation, prolonging the problem with the solution (Andeweg, 2000). Corporatist 
power-sharing may have limited feasibility outside a system of proportional representation. 
For example, in a winner-take-all democracy, minority group demands may find little traction 
since there may be little incentive for established parties to negotiate. Furthermore, recent 
immigrants from non-Western cultures may not possess leaders with the knowledge and skill-
set to engage in sophisticated legal bargaining. In this example, the state might develop 
emerging leaders from constituent groups. In the sphere of education, rigid separation might 
make sense only where the divisions between groups are jagged and raw. Even then, first 
steps towards some curricular commonality to foster intercultural competence seem 
appropriate. The aforementioned civic education project in Bosnia-Herzegovina provides an 
example of how deep divisions might be ameliorated through cooperative strategies (Soule, 
2000, 2002). Ultimately, the comprehensiveness of the consociational answer may neither be 
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necessary nor desirable without a critical mass of ‘ideological renegades’ to mollify (Kruijt, 
1957). Thus, a softer form of educational pluralism might be preferable. 
Second, the problem of ‘voluntary apartheid’ (Halstead, 1995). Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities offered a way of coalescing around group solidarity to achieve 
emancipation. The metaphor may not be apt to today’s conditions. First, the HBCU’s were 
largely created because of legal segregation. Second, their end goal was integration. Legal 
segregation of public services no longer exists; and religious fundamentalists may use schools 
to promote insularity from a larger society composed of what they perceive as heretics and 
apostates. Since mandatory intercultural education in heterogeneous settings may have only 
limited effect, a gradualist approach might be desirable. At the primary level, education 
occurs within a cultural template; however, later schooling occurs within a heterogeneous 
enrolment divested from overt group influence (Halstead, 1999). With no secondary schools 
left operative, this describes the current condition of Islamic state-funded school in the 
Netherlands.  
Third, the problem of structural inequality. Beyond questions of educational content, 
ethnic residential patterns and growing levels of economic inequality perpetuate school 
segregation in Western industrialized countries (Semyonov & Glikman, 2009). In 1988, thirty 
percent of Blacks and Hispanics attended an extremely segregated school in the United States, 
in 2010 that percentage exceeded forty percent (Kahlenburg, 2011). How much of this 
segregation is really voluntary? The framework’s reconceptualization of ‘separate but equal’ 
may not be appropriate for all contexts. Also, as has been the case in the Netherlands with 
Islamic schools, some groups may find they are unable to attract an inclusive enrolment 
(Merry & Driessen, 2005). Besides the moral dimension, a pluriform educational platform to 
accommodate minorities ‘may apply only to societies which are pluralist in the sense that no 
single cultural group forms a majority within the state’ (Halstead, 1999, p. 259). Population 
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density and settlement patterns would also seem to play a role, since concentrations of 
homogeneous communities would provide economies of scale for religio-cultural schools.  
   
8.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
First, the viability of legal pluralism in providing a platform for state-funded Islamic 
schooling in Western democracies requires further study. The fact that the last remaining 
Islamic secondary schools were closed in the Netherlands highlights the challenge this 
community faces in securing government support. Emerging cross-national research reveals 
Anglo-Saxon countries have had little success with multicultural policies for the 
socioeconomic and sociocultural integration of recent Muslim immigrants (Koopmans, 2013). 
Second, the idea of cultural identity schools could be expanded in terms of studying 
their functionality as school-family-community partnerships. For immigrants, schools might 
promote community engagement through assuming a more active collaborative role with 
parents. Social capital might be improved by using schools after-hours for evening language 
classes and providing a liaison for answering inquiries about matters such as obtaining a 
driver’s license or paying taxes.  
Third, further investigation of cultural identity schooling relative to legal-
constitutional principles is required. Cross-national comparisons of equal protection statutes 
and rulings would yield answers to the questions of why some groups are able to form schools 
while others are not. For example, national minorities tend to have more rights to their own 
schools than immigrant minorities. The reasoning could be compared with the Universal 
Declaration of Rights: ‘Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children’ (UN, 1948, 26.3). 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 Leaders from Western democracies display an increasing bent to proclaim the virtues 
of civil society. King Willem Alexander used the occasion of his first address to parliament to 
announce the birth of the participatiesamenleving (participation society) (Springer, 2013). In 
his annual Christmas message, Prime Minister David Cameron lauded the millions ‘playing 
their part in countless small ways to help build what I call the big society’ (Watt, 2013). At a 
recent forum, President Barack Obama reflected on his beginnings as a low-income 
community organizer to underline his message of the importance of governments working in 
partnership with civil societies (The White House, 2013). These remarks occur at the same 
time as their governments repudiate the welfare state and recalibrate their commitments to 
vulnerable social segments. The hope is that these are not mere rhetorical flourishes, but 
signal a commitment to engage with groups on equal terms. As I have argued, the validation 
of cultural commitments strengthens participatory democracy and increases the array of 
choices citizens have in forging their lives. 
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